

# Marine Corps

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FORTY CENTS

# Gazette



# Marine Corps Gazette

MARCH 1957  
NUMBER 3  
VOLUME 41

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**THIS MONTH AND NEXT** On the cover is one of the innovations of the "new warfare" for which the Marine Corps is primarily responsible. The newly-converted, troop-carrying assault helicopter carrier USS *Thetis Bay* is now operational on the West Coast practicing some of the latest theories of projecting US seapower ashore by means of our Fleet Marine Forces. For more on this ship see page 32.

Next month the GAZETTE will present a study of a campaign in retrograde and retreat. The author was the army group commander of the German forces in southern Russia.

Unfortunately no Soviet source was available to give a complete picture by showing the other side. The narrative, however, will be punctuated with editorial comments by B. H. Liddell Hart to set it in its proper historical perspective. Also, in April or May, as soon as the material can be prepared, the GAZETTE will publish a series of articles dealing in detail with the new FMF reorganization and how the findings were reached.

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### Two-block the A&S Pennant

... I would like to express my views on Col Heint's letter in the January *Message Center*. The disturbing factor to this Marine is the reason for such conversations as those cited by the Colonel in his article between the Marine and his squad leader, and the so-called gunnery sergeant and the Pfc under instruction, who allows his men to address him without prefixing his rank or title. If the Colonel's suggestions were put into official application throughout the entire Marine Corps, would it suffice in the mission it would be intended for? As he states: "... so that there would be disciplinary teeth to enforce." I believe that the problem would still exist to some extent for the simple reason that those NCOs who allow men to refer to them in a slovenly un-military manner would be the same people who would allow a breach of a mandatory form of courtesy as well as allowing a breach of the customary respect handed down to all NCOs by those before us. This problem (brought to our attention in print by Col Heint) is one created by the NCOs themselves, or I should say a few NCOs, but has been allowed to grow by many of us for one reason or the other. Since this problem was started by the NCOs, I think it should be left to them to correct as well.

If we noncommissioned officers want to correct this problem the necessary

authority can be found in our warrants. ... Marines are taught military courtesy early after their arrival at a recruit depot. It is after they leave the leadership of their drill instructor that they acquire the unmilitary habits that Col Heint has brought to our attention.

Courtesy is in no way a sign of subservency; it is merely a custom among people of the civilized world in showing respect for his fellow man and in no way is a sign of physical or mental weakness. In the military, courtesy takes on some additional meanings. First, it shows respect for authority and secondly it is a necessary factor in a highly disciplined organization. I believe the custom (of 181 years' standing) of carrying on a courteous conversation can be enforced by leadership just as well if not better than by a compulsory measure. However, it has to be done by us NCOs ourselves and in unison, but only then if we want to. *Aye, Aye, Sergeant Major!*

SSGT G. L. SAXTON

Peoria, Ill.

### Head Set

... The French Military Scholar, Ardant du Picq observed that in the history of warfare, weapons, tactics and techniques change, but man remains the only common denominator. I respectfully wish to add one other specific constant; i.e. the means by which this man communicates during a fire fight.

Our smallest units, the fire team, squad, and platoons are usually quite adept in the use of arm and hand signals, but are these arm and hand signals used in combat? Having questioned a few experienced combat leaders of WW II and Korea, I discovered to my surprise that not one admitted having ever used or seen used a combat signal.


Further questioning revealed the fact that all commands in a fire fight were given in one of two manners. One was to shout as loud as possible; the other was to decrease the distance involved by running and then shout as loud as possible.

A possible solution was the basis of a recent advertisement in a news magazine. The scene was ground combat. Infantrymen were advancing under fire. They carried the usual accoutrements but additionally each man wore a parachutist-like helmet in which was installed a radio receiver. Remembering my own combat experience, I immediately recalled problems which could have been overcome quicker, easier and better if this novel advertisement had then been a reality.

I'm not necessarily offering these individual radio sets as the solution. My technical knowledge of the subject prohibits. Lungs and leg power are, however, no match for amplifiers and radio waves. NAVMC 1046 states, "The aggressive, intelligent and effective employment of the rifle squad in combat is the primary basis for success in battle." This being true, even in our thermonuclear age, anything that can be done to make that success more probable is very desirable.

CAPT T. D. PARSONS

2d MarDiv, FMF



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## The British Four Deuce

... I read with great interest the article written by Capt C. B. Haslam in which he compares US and Foreign Heavy Mortars. I found the article of particular interest since the School of Artillery in England has just concluded a comparative evaluation of foreign mortars including 3 of the mortars discussed in the article.

Capt Haslam points out in this article that the British 4.2-inch mortar cannot be manpacked due to the weight of the baseplate. This is true of the mobile baseplate. But there is also in existence a manpack baseplate weighing 120 lbs. which allows the mortar to be fired from a position where it is impossible to take the mobile baseplate. I should also point out that the weight of the bomb for this weapon is 20 lbs. and not 30 lbs. as stated.

LtCOL J. G. WHITTAKER  
Royal Artillery

British Liaison Officer  
TAS, Ft Sill, Okla.

## Errors

... I am writing in regard to my article *A Look at the Middle East* in the January issue. There are two errors in the article: p 48, col 3, should read *16th Century*; p 50, col 3, states that the reckoning of Islamic time uses the death

## EXCLUSIVE!

A comprehensive account of the new organization and structure of the Fleet Marine Force will appear in the *GAZETTE* in either the April or May issues. A series of articles on this important subject is being prepared by members of the "FMF Structure and Composition Board" which met at Quantico from June to December of 1956. MajGen R. E. Hogaboom, who headed the Board, is supervising preparation of the articles.

of Mohammed as its origin. The *Hegira*, 622, is the point of departure in reckoning Islamic time.

R. S. HIBBS

Springfield, Va.

## Not Enough Time

... How often have we heard or used this expression when confronted with the results of insufficient training or instruction? It's a crutch too many of us use these days when we rationalize our shortcomings, in not measuring up to the standards expected of the US Marine Corps.

Actually, if carefully analysed, we


can't afford not to take the time to thoroughly instruct in every possible field in which a person is expected to perform. Yes, and review and review and review. To prove the point, the man hours required to satisfy justice in a recent homicide case are estimated as follows:

|   |       |
|---|-------|
| Pre-trial and investigation   | 144   |
| Office hours and time to review investigation                             | 10    |
| Time of investigators   | 16    |
| Seven court members, law officer and councils                             | 240   |
| Witnesses   | 30    |
| Court reporters and orderly   | 56    |
| Loss of time of the guilty person (from investigation to end of sentence) | 1,440 |
| Total, man hours  | 1,936 |
| (or nearly 8 months lost for one man)                                     |       |

And, in this case the evidence suggested that if the accused had been sufficiently schooled in the use and operation of the 45 cal. automatic pistol the life of a Marine would not have been needlessly lost. Incidentally, this latter factor has not been included in the above calculation since the author is unable to equate the life of one Marine to man hours. There isn't enough time!

LtCOL W. H. MARSH

Quantico, Va.



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
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There has been no reorganization of our smallest tactical combat units since WWII. In keeping with the changing times the Corps must act now!

# NO COMPROMISE HERE

By 2dLt A. J. O'Keefe



IT HAS BEEN AND STILL IS THE common accusation of military tacticians and historians that the victor in a war has been content to rest secure on his laurels. Sunk in this state of lethargy, he can become a prey, not only to the curse of mediocrity in the military sense, but also to other ambitious nations greedy for power. Has the United States Government been guilty of this offense? In some cases the answer must be "yes." True, our military leaders have employed the helicopter in warfare to some extent and are experimenting with the tactical use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, but what of the infantryman? Is he the forgotten man? And, in particular, what of the *Marine* infantryman?

Since the close of World War II there has been no major reorganization in the tactical combat units of the Corps. The employment of atomic weapons in warfare demands a greater dispersion of troops. Considering this factor, there is a necessity for weapons employing a higher

rate of fire. That is where the new weapons now being tested—the T44, FN and their automatic counterparts, the T44E1 and FNHB—enter the picture.

Students of military history and military tacticians themselves co-gently realize that the art and science of warfare have evolved during the centuries since the combat of armed men first began. The principles of warfare have never changed. The alteration of tactics, as weapons have become technically more perfect, has merely influenced them. Principles aptly formulated, aided and abetted by strategic genius will ultimately mean victory.

Generations have faded into the corridors of history since the mighty hordes of Alexander the Great gained mastery of the then known world. Caesar, Richard the Lion-Heart, Frederick the Great, Washington, Grant and Lee are but the memories of bygone days. Why mention these military titans? Call to mind their tactics—the mass, the

thin line, the armed knights of the Crusades, a portent of the Panzer divisions of the second world conflict. These men and their accomplishments are now relegated to the students' textbooks and the thoughtful reveries of the enthusiast of history. The world has reached the Atomic Age, the "pushbutton" warfare of mass destruction. Our tactics today demand a dispersal of manpower. This will offer protection in the event nuclear weapons are employed.

But, to offset this "scattering" of troops, a more powerful firearm embodying a high rate of fire is of grave necessity. The weapon has been created and is now being tested. Assuming that it does not fail its stringent examinations, how will its adoption influence the United States Marine Corps?

Over a decade has passed since the Second World War ended. With the grand finale, science began to delve ever more deeply into military study. Even before the final "cease-

|           | Weight     | Length | Automatic<br>Rate of<br>Fire | Muzzle<br>Velocity | Clip<br>Capacity | Maximum<br>Range | Maximum<br>Effective<br>Range | Bayonet | Grenade<br>Launcher |
|-----------|------------|--------|------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|---------|---------------------|
| M1 Rifle  | 9.5 lbs.   | 43. 6" | 30 rpm                       | 2600-2800 fps      | 8 rds            | 3500 yds         | 500 yds                       | yes     | yes                 |
| FN Rifle  | 9.25 lbs.  | 44. 5" | 650-700 rpm                  | 2805 fps           | 20 rds           | 3500 yds         | 600 yds                       | yes     | yes                 |
| T44 Rifle | 8.33 lbs.  | 44. 4" | 650-700 rpm                  | 2805 fps           | 20 rds           | 3500 yds         | 600 yds                       | yes     | yes                 |
| BAR       | 19.4 lbs.  | —      | 550 rpm                      | —                  | 20 rds           | 3500 yds         | 500 yds                       | —       | —                   |
| FNHB      | 14 lbs.    | —      | 700 rpm                      | —                  | 20 rds           | 3500 yds         | 600 yds                       | —       | —                   |
| T44E1     | 14 lbs.    | —      | 700 rpm                      | —                  | 20 rds           | 3500 yds         | 600 yds                       | —       | —                   |
| LMG       | 49.75 lbs. | 41.11" | 400-550 rpm                  | 2800 fps           | 250 rds          | 2400 yds         | 1000 yds                      | —       | —                   |

fire," the United States had flexed its muscles of nuclear power. The first atomic-type bombs had brought the Japanese nation to its knees and had effected "peace" in a troubled universe. With the advent of these new missiles of warfare, the race for armament superiority began. Atomic, hydrogen and cobalt bombs became the terror of mankind. Jet aircraft came of age during the Korean engagement, in which the Marine Corps played an integral part. Atomic artillery firing high velocity shells gives promise of influencing warfare. Further, the helicopter played an important role in the Korean conflict. Its wartime employment guaranteed a new idea in both the "hit and run" tactics of infantry and in the general scope of land warfare. The mobility of the "egg-beater" is of significant value.

In spite of these factors, destined to play an active part in any conflict, the Corps remained static. Granted it has operated very effectively, there is still the concept that this unit must acclimate itself to change and thereby perform its mission in an even more efficient manner.

It was in the year 1952 that an event occurred which envisioned a possible major alteration in the tactical organization of the United States Marine Corps. Science had invented and was performing frequent experiments on new lightweight rifles. These are the T44 and FN rifles and their automatic supplements, the T44E1 and FNHB. The weapons are a possible replacement for those in use at present by the infantry units of the Marine Division.

A comparison of the present weapons with those of experimental data is shown above.

How will these weapons alter the tactical organization of the Marine Corps? Would their adoption

revolutionize the fields of tactics and training? The question I am asking is one which can and undoubtedly will cause frequent debate. Officers, Staff NCOs and enlisted men new to the Corps may stand up and take notice. It is high time the T/O of the Marine Corps be altered. Let's not get caught in the shuffle or it may be too late. The time to act is now! The byword must be: *No compromises here!*

The Marine Corps must anticipate a decision to adopt a new infantry weapon in the very near future. The decision will simplify the "weapons system" of present-day infantry units. The essential characteristics applying to weapons in use now will be discernible. Weight will be slightly less than the M1. This is the FN or the T44 which is frequently mentioned.


Semi-automatic fire will be available to the rifleman, while the BAR counterparts, i.e., the FNHB and T44E1, will be capable of firing either at semi-automatic or full automatic rate. A straight line stock will permit more accurate fully automatic bursts from the FNHB and T44E1, provided with a bipod. With these innovations will there be then any organizational or tactical implications for a Marine Corps whose every rifleman would possess the firepower of the present BAR or more?

Basically, two alternatives are possible in the question of organization. One result would increase the firepower three or four times. This would occur by issuing the new rifle to the present organization of the Marine Corps. There would be retained, in essence, the same organization with its proven capabilities, and for warfare of an atomic age, corresponding weaknesses. The existing Marine infantry unit has been proven in two wars, and has been

found more than satisfactory. But it has remained static for over a decade. Increasing fire power at the cutting edge without a growth in the number of men has obvious attractions and would perform the mission. This is the simple solution. However, the present organization is great in number and has sometimes been considered unwieldy.

By issuing a new rifle to the present organization, firepower is intensified only in the infantry. True, speed and mobility have been improved with the progress of helicopter transport, but helicopters are not yet and may never be plentiful. They are merely a hypothetical possibility. Furthermore, moving organizations large in numbers make slow progress. In the "new look," less manpower has been set as the goal because of manpower shortages, economic reasons, and the fact that concentrated forces are vulnerable to nuclear attack. Yet, the same figures and densities are obtained when merely substituting one weapon for another in the existing T/O.

Thus, the trend is toward a manpower reduction of the armed forces and a streamlining of its organiza-







**2d Lt O'Keefe** came into the Marine Corps after being graduated from Holy Cross College last June as the "Outstanding Contract Student of 1956." Still under instruction at the Basic School, he hopes to be assigned to the infantry field upon finishing at Quantico and then sent directly overseas. Lt O'Keefe's reason for writing the article was "an eagerness to become a part of the Marine Corps family and share in the continuance of its future glory."

tional forms. With this in mind, a further examination looking to possible reorganization based on the new rifle would be expedient. Therefore, an alternative to be regarded with deeper significance is to keep the firepower the same but reduce the number of men needed to generate it.

One aspect of the development of weapons and tactics in the past hundred years has been an increase in the size of infantry units to more than twice their number. During this same period, firepower (through technological developments) and dispersion or frontage occupied have increased appreciably. These innovations were normal and the proper means of control, by employment of motors and electronic communications, with two exceptions, has kept pace. These exceptions are the platoon and the squad. Personnel, firepower and frontages of these basic units have increased through the years but the platoon commanders' and squad leaders' means of control have not. It would therefore seem suitable to reduce the size of platoons and squads. The subsequent result would be that the leader could again control his unit on the battlefield by personal orders and direction.

This alternate solution, in harmony with the "new look" and future combat requirements would be: retain the same firepower, but reduce the number of men needed to develop it. *In other words, decrease the size of the rifle squad, yet maintain the firepower of the existing organization.* From the Marine Corps point of view, a reduction in manpower while maintaining present firepower has its attractions and good points. Maintaining present firepower with less manpower means a deployment of the identical com-

bat power in a physically smaller package. The requirements of amphibious operations with landing craft of limited size and capabilities would have the actuality of complete tactical integrity with smaller units. These units would be able to function as a composite whole. Platoon leaders would be then given a far greater responsibility and the need for imagination and leadership of top notch quality would be a requisite.

This possibility is vastly important in these days when the "economy axe" is cutting Armed Forces to the bone. At the same time, worldwide commitments remain the same or are increasing. In the final analysis, United States manpower is the most expensive item of national defense. If we can field just as strong a team with fewer men, economy is served—from the cost of recruiting and training to the ultimate and more important goal of fewer casualties resulting from exposing less men in a given impact area.

Similar firepower with a reduction in men would mean smaller, handier units. These units would be composed of more select men, better trained and more responsive to their commanders' control. A combat unit of firepower, equivalent to a larger present day unit, would occupy less cube or weight in a landing craft or helicopter. The present rifle platoon is too large for any landing craft or helicopter. When reinforced with crew served weapons, it is grossly unwieldy. In either case, to be moved mechanically it must be divided between vehicles, with the resultant loss of tactical integrity. A smaller platoon with the identical firepower might be lifted on one vehicle and tactical integrity thereby preserved. Fewer vehicles would be needed to transport companies

and battalions, with a corresponding increase in economy and mobility.

Smaller units with comparable firepower would require less cube and weight for all supplies except ammunition. Fewer service troops would be needed to handle these supplies and even a smaller number of troops would be used to support the service troops. At this rate, the division might be reduced 50 per cent—from 20,000 to 10,000 men. It would have the combat power of the present division, or, conversely, two divisions for the price (in manpower) of one.

Of even greater importance is a feature applying both to conventional combat and future warfare with nuclear weapons. This is the fact that for a given combat power, less troops would be in the fighting zone. This applies whether the killing zone is enemy protective fire laid down in front of his defenses, or the destructive radius of a nuclear explosion. Mobility would be increased as fewer vehicles would be required for a move, columns would be shorter, supplies to be moved, less. Dispersion and increased mobility without loss of combat power would become an actuality.

The foregoing has been a general discussion, but what, specifically, is visualized as a possible organization? With every man armed with a BAR, two 3-man fire teams would have far more than the firepower of a squad's 3 BARs and 9 rifles. Therefore, a squad armed with 4 of the new rifles, either FN or T44, plus 2 of the modern automatic rifles, and adequately trained, would well surpass the firepower of the present squad. Add a seventh man as squad leader to develop fully the other 6 and the rifle squad of the future has come to life. Three of these squads, plus a platoon headquarters of a platoon commander, platoon sergeant and runner, form the rifle platoon—a total of 24 men. This platoon would have slightly more than one-half of the man strength of the present platoon, yet potentially would have an easily achieved equivalent firepower.

A question has been raised in the case of crew served weapons. It is conjectured that there may be a



light machine gun version of the new rifle. This might feature a heavier barrel for sustained fire, a mount and possibly a belt feed attachment. The internal mechanism would be similar to that of the rifle. Therefore, one syllabus of mechanical training would serve for all 3 weapons. The new rifle would replace the M1 rifle, while the heavier models would replace the BAR and the machine gun. Time saved by training with one basic weapon rather than with 4 would result in more training available for effective development of combat techniques and tactics and certainly would lead to more flexibility in utilization of personnel.

With a lighter weapon and lighter ammunition, the size of a light machine gun squad could be reduced to 4 men. The squad leader could be the gunner and carry the weapon. The other 3 men would be ammunition carriers. This is 2 ammunition carriers less than with the present machine gun squad. However, with lighter ammunition, the same number of rounds or even a few more could be carried without any difficulty.

No change is envisioned in the present company mortar or rocket

launcher units. All individuals would, of course, be armed with the new semi-automatic rifle with several supplementary automatic rifles. This would furnish them with self-protection. It would enable them not only to form a company base of fire with their mortars and antitank weapons, but also to defend and hold this fire base. They would thus form a firm pivot of maneuver for the company.

The same advantages would obtain further to the rear with fire for the logistical support elements of battalion, regiment and division. A few men armed with the new rifle would generate tremendous firepower in defense of rear areas against breakthroughs, guerrilla or airborne attack. With a grenade launcher as a vital part of the new rifle, each Marine in rear areas as well as in the front lines will have the capability to hit not only everything he can see with well-aimed flat trajectory fire, but he will also be able to reach into defilade or penetrate tank armor.

One officer and 44 men compose the present Marine Corps infantry platoon.

The revolutionized platoon would have an organization of one officer


and 23 men. The officer would be armed with the .45 caliber pistol, while the platoon sergeant and the runner would carry a new semi-automatic rifle. Although this platoon would have slightly more than one-half the manpower of the present platoon, actually it is equivalent in firepower. Not only will it result in units which can be controlled more easily, but this change in tactical organization will make it possible for men to be of a more highly trained capacity.

Speaking in terms of an infantry division, it might be possible to reduce the strength to 10,000 men. The division would have the same firepower as the present component. Furthermore, we would now have two divisions in manpower for the price of one.

✦ TACTICS—individual small unit and combined arms—would not change to a great extent with the advent of a new rifle and its concomitant organizational change. Fire and maneuver will still be the basic concern. Supporting weapons can and will form a base of fire. Infantry will still close and destroy the enemy, and thereby seize and hold key terrain. However, the density of


### THE PRESENT TACTICAL ORGANIZATION

Platoon Level:



### THE PROPOSED TACTICAL ORGANIZATION

Platoon Level:





men on the battlefield would be less, since the firepower generated by each man would be greater. Movement of infantry by tank, wheeled vehicle and helicopter could be more rapid and more extensive.

Control may be an increased problem with greater movement and wider dispersion. However, with fewer men an effort should be made to employ a better type of man. A well-indoctrinated, well-trained man will evidence greater efficiency and initiative in tight spots. The time saved training with one weapon rather than with 4 could be well applied to perfecting the required control and initiative. Further, tactical integrity would be greatly improved. With the advent of a new platoon, the possibility of a landing craft or helicopter ferrying an entire unit to its objective would be an actuality. The elements of tactical surprise, security and economy will appeal to one and all. An airborne amphibious landing can and will be the order of the day. These are concepts to be considered here and now.

Within the present rifle squad, the maneuver of 3 elements can be unnecessary and unduly complicated. Squad offensive combat is generally straightforward action—one part of the squad moving forward, while another furnishes covering fire.

Flanking action is at best close in and against one enemy flank. This elemental scheme of maneuver does not necessitate a triangular organization. Rather, it demands an organization by twos. The proposed 7-man squad answers this need. It provides two 3-man fire teams under the direction of the squad leader. This may seem paradoxical to the opening sentence. However, careful analyzing will prove such is not the case. Each fire team is of itself a tactical entity if required to operate separately; one man moves, while the others give covering fire. Thus, the new rifle would permit a smaller squad built on this fundamental concept. Aided and abetted by the automatic rifle, supremacy on the field of conflict will be achieved. The automatic rifle has been and will continue to be the key weapon. Control and tactics would be simplified at the level where the realities of combat make simplification an absolute necessity.

There is one other problem facing the Corps—that of logistics. Who will supply the rapid firing T44? And the T44E1? The answer is self-evident. A Marine Division in the field needs 15 tons of ammunition per wartime day. With a reduction in manpower, the Division's needs will be cut in half, as regards water, rations and fuel. However, ammunition needs will remain the same and may even increase. Added to this is the reduction in cartridge weight. Today's BAR man, carrying 7 20-round magazines, has a pay load of 9.26 lbs. The Marine of the future, armed with the T44 or FN, will be able to carry a pay load of 9 20-round magazines, weighing only 9.36 lbs., as a result of a decrease in cartridge weight. The advantage of the increase in ammunition will be well appreciated by all concerned. When and if the rifleman finds himself in need of ammunition, it is the

plan to have 3 riflemen per platoon designated as ammunition carriers. These men, armed with a .45 caliber pistol, will have the sole duty of keeping riflemen in the front lines supplied with ammunition at all times.

The key point of this possible change in the Corps T/O has been contemplated and explained. The result will be the employment of a unit reduced in size but capable of maintaining a fire power equivalent to that of the platoon, company, battalion, regiment or division of today. True, the manpower of the division may be noticeably reduced. However, the savings in the fields of supply and logistics will present a a noteworthy advantage.

Were Headquarters Marine Corps to retain the same manpower in the Division and adopt the new weapons, what would be the result? There undoubtedly would be an increase in the ammunition supply; however, other logistical problems will remain constant. A reduction in small unit manpower, while retaining the same over-all Division strength, can revolutionize tactics. With a proposed tactical platoon of one officer and 26 men, the battalion could have 5 companies instead of the normal 3. This would permit the battalion commander to employ a greater flexibility of units in combat. Rather than the proven theory of "2 up and one back," the CO would be able to use his tactical imagination freely and with deliberation. The ideas of "3 up and 2 back," "one, 3 and one," or "4 up and one back" would be those of an entirely new notion—ideal for the tactical dispersion of an atomic age war.

We are in a world which changes from day to day. The Corps has a firm basis in history and tradition but it must not permit this to lull it into lethargy. The time to act is now!

US MC

### ★ ★ ★ ★

#### Detection

✿ IT HAPPENED one summer day while I was inspecting a Formal Guard Mount just after the tie clasp came into being. Not until the actual inspection was underway did I realize that my tie clasp (at that time not yet authorized) should have been in my pocket instead of on my tie. About then I faced a fine looking Marine, all squared away but for the fact that he, too, was wearing his tie clasp. "What uniform regulation are you and I both violating?" was the question I asked.

After a slow up-and-down glance at me and an even slower once-over of himself, came the red-faced quavering answer: "Black shoe polish, Sir?"

Maj J. J. Kelley

(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)



**KAMAN  
HOK-1  
SHOWS ITS  
MUSCLE**



Undergoing U. S. Army evaluation tests including airlifting externally slung cargo, this Marine Corps HOK-1 demonstrates its ability. Shown here carrying a 2500 lb. jeep, it also takes artillery pieces, gas drums, ammo cases and other bulky material in stride.

HOK-1 general utility helicopters are already in service with the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps where they are used extensively for search and rescue missions, medical evacuation, personnel transport and cargo carrying.


The development and production of utility helicopters is but one of many contributions Kaman has made to our National Defense effort. We're proud to be of service.

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By LtCol R. P. Keller

# AMPHIBIOUS AVIATION

THE ROSE-COLORED ATOMIC cloud which climbed over Hiroshima on a fateful summer day more than 12 years ago cast a portentous shadow over the hopes of mankind. This shadow looms ever larger over civilization in general, and the military scene in particular. It is true that no nuclear weapon has been exploded in anger since Nagasaki.

It is true also that a decade of moralizing, of alternately viewing atomics with alarm and as "just another weapon in the evolution of warfare," has tended to mitigate the first awe-stricken reaction experienced by so many when first they heard about one stupendous bomb equivalent to 40-million pounds of TNT. Those who read these lines

may recall their own emotions and thoughts upon learning that an entire city was all but obliterated by one airplane carrying one weapon. The impact of that day may by now have been largely washed from memory. However, it is easy to recall that military thinkers were not long in reacting to the challenge of the times by devising new tactics for sur-

face warfare.

These tactics involved the employment of smaller units which were to be widely dispersed, rapidly concentrated as necessary to achieve a military effect, then dispersed again. This, of course, was to minimize the opportunities for an enemy to determine the existence of a target and deliver an atomic blast upon it. Despite progress in developing the capability to use such tactics, there are still those to this day who are sure in their own minds that no surface action of any consequence can be risked if the opponent has the capability of delivering atomic weapons. The role of surface warfare is relegated to the later stages of a conflict when, according to proponents of that theory, the outcome of the issue will have been predetermined by the results of the nuclear exchange. Yet, there is a flaw in that theory. That flaw is the growing unlikelihood of gross nuclear exchange in the face of the gross hurt which inevitably would be visited upon all parties to the conflict. A rational examination of hydrogen weapon warfare makes apparent the extreme unlikelihood that there can be a real victor. The logical, almost Euclidean deduction, therefore, is that the chances of large nuclear exchange between major nations lessen as the certainty of extreme catastrophic destruction to both sides grows. By no means does this imply that nations are *certain* to resolve issues henceforth equitably and without military conflict—even nuclear in nature. The cleavages and issues between peoples are yet too great to give any assurance that a pacifistic world society is imminent. This being the case, it is clear that we must maintain military vigilance to the best of our abilities, and keep our combat units fit to fight under any condition of warfare to which they may be exposed.

In line with this reasoning, it follows that the Armed Forces of the United States should be able to fight combat actions at least a little better than potential enemies. Herein lies the simple goal of the Marine Corps—the maintenance of an effective, ready, modern combat capability in our own special area of endeavor, the amphibious operation.

What about that amphibious operation? Where does it fit into the modern military scene? The art of amphibious warfare, of course, is a composite of many things. It is being refined constantly in the light of current skills, techniques and scientific accomplishment. More than that, however, it is made significant through experience, the courage of fighting men and constant, searching analysis of fundamentals. We of the Marine Corps pledge our service years to provide our country with an amphibious ability, and to maintain a constant readiness to exhibit our accomplishments when, unfortunately, explosives replace expletives. There can be no time more propitious than the present to undertake another examination of amphibious fundamentals—a time when we are not engaged in battle, but could be over-night. Now, when we at least partially perceive the changes which must be wrought in our forces to survive and win a battle in the nuclear age, but have some distance to go in the satisfaction of what we estimate those requirements to be. It is to that purpose that this article now turns. Not, however, to consider all fundamentals of amphibious warfare. Rather, to treat primarily of aviation. Aviation, that complicated, brash science wherein man apparently defies so many natural laws, by his knowing skill and ingenuity in taking advantage of many others. Aviation, which bodes both good and ill to friend and foe alike, without which no modern war will be fought or won. Aviation, a major *sine qua non* of the amphibious operation.


Our task here will be to take a fresh look at aviation as a participant in amphibious operations, and try to arrive at some logical, useful conclusions. Surely, if we do not understand fully something so important as aviation, we cannot organize and use it properly. If we cannot organize and use it properly, it will not be effective. If it is not effective, the enemy undoubtedly will prevail.

What, now, about a delineation of the areas under consideration? They are twofold. First, that broad area which may be defined for the purposes of this article as comprising the technical competence necessary

for effective aviation. This includes equipment and technically trained men. Second, the broad area of professional competence necessary for proper exploitation of these technical capabilities. For example, the competence of staff planners to determine the most effective uses of the technical aviation resources which they may have to apply to battle situations. Upon these two foundation-posts, professional and technical competence, are based the validity of amphibious aviation.

Now, however, let us turn for a moment to look at the amphibious operation of the future in order to have a yardstick with which to measure our amphibious aviation problems. It is apparent that the amphibious operation of the future must be characterized by a number of distinguishing features. If we take the major phases of preparation, assault, and consolidation and defense, we can consider what these distinguishing features must be. Initially, the preparatory phase may be characterized by extremely widespread nuclear and other weapon attacks upon enemy installations and resources, likely primarily through the air. Guided missiles also will be employed as applicable to a particular situation. The assault phase will follow so closely upon this short, destructive preparatory phase as almost to weld them into one, in order to take maximum advantage of the enemy's losses before his recuperative and retaliatory powers are developed. The assault forces, to the greatest degree permitted by science and the American economy, will have maximum mobility, maximum fire power and provide the minimum target to enemy counteraction. The enemy will be kept reeling from successive blows, never being permitted to regain any significant advantage.

The objective area, because of the nature and capabilities of the forces involved, will be relatively extensive. Certain former terrain and littoral considerations, paramount in past amphibious operations, will be of







***Seaborne amphibious aviation possesses a global flexibility***

much less importance. For example, slope, length and depth characteristics of beaches will not have the same order of criticality as heretofore. The future amphibious operation will have a much wider range of possible application, making enemy defensive preparations immeasurably more difficult. Also, the operation will be covered by co-ordinated combat actions not necessarily within the particular amphibious objective area. Control and resupply of these highly mobile, potent, effective amphibious forces will be critical. However, the assault issue likely will be decided in a relatively short period, in view of the combat power which will be inherent to the forces involved.

With that as a concise, if general, sketch of future amphibious operations, let us relate aviation to it. To do this, we consider again the three broad amphibious phases—preparatory, assault, consolidation and defense.

It was stated above that air-delivered weapons will play a major role in the preparatory phase. Without using a real situation, no true analysis can be made of the specific air requirements for the preparatory effort. However, the purpose of that preparatory attack obviously would be to destroy the enemy's defending resources. With the range and mobility of current aircraft and those projected for development, widespread attacks would be required against his air and guided missile capabilities. This could well involve almost global air operations. Therefore, except in a limited situation, aviation forces well beyond those

connected with an amphibious task force necessarily would be involved. Turning this around, it could be stated that amphibious aviation would be involved in this preparatory attack only to the extent that other aviation would not suffice. Probably amphibious aviation would have responsibility for air operations in the area covering the approaches to and containing the objective and immediately adjacent areas. Until the ranges of all types of aircraft are markedly increased, and the requirements for fixed aviation installations and airfields markedly reduced, amphibious aviation operating in the preparatory phase likely will do so from aircraft carriers.

During assault operations, air efforts of all sorts will occur. The mobility of the ground forces largely will be a function of aviation. Reconnaissance, observation, local air defense, close support and combat resupply will be intimately associated with the moment to moment progress of the assault forces. No less important, but somewhat more remote from observation will be those longer range air efforts designed to prevent the enemy from imposing his aerial will upon the assault forces. Co-ordinating these air operations will be ground-based control elements and their airborne extensions, equipped with varieties of electronic equipments. Sustaining these air operations will be the logistic back-up effort designed to maintain the tempo of air operations.

When the issue of the battle has been decided favorably and, temporarily at least, the enemy accepted

his defeat, there follows the period of consolidation, regroupment and seeing to defensive requirements of the objective attained. In this phase, the emphasis of air operations and capabilities may shift. Those aviation forces intimately associated with ground forces in the hour by hour course of battle must be maintained in a ready state. Likely the initial onslaught of a revived enemy would be met and blunted by air defense forces, including guided missiles, if not prevented from being launched by means of far-ranging attacks on his air bases, launching sites and supporting installations. As a matter of fact, those forces which at times are involved in the closest association with the ground effort later may well become important participants in the air defense effort.

What, then, are the desired characteristics and requirements for amphibious aviation in view of the pattern which it now appears amphibious operations will develop? To state these characteristics and requirements broadly is much easier than to achieve them. In any event, it appears that it would be useful to make a differentiation between "amphibious aviation" and other aviation which has a relationship to the amphibious operation. It is offered here that amphibious aviation is that which is intimately involved with the ground elements of an amphibious assault force; that aviation which figures directly in the hour-by-hour course of surface battle. Specifically, amphibious aviation is considered to be those aviation forces which provide the ground forces with mobility and logistic support, which apply their ordnance within sight and hearing or under the direction of surface amphibious force agencies, and which furnish information that may affect the disposition and operational plans of the surface forces on almost an immediate basis. Other aviation related to the amphibious operation is considered to be that which performs any service necessary to the conduct of an amphibious operation, other than the foregoing. This would apply to deep interdiction, long-range air superiority operations, long-range logistic airlift, and casualty evacuation from rear bases, for example. It is evident that these definitions are not absolute nor

all-inclusive. However, they are intended to indicate an area of different requirements for aviation forces as they affect the amphibious operation.

Amphibious aviation elements must be available immediately when the assault commences. In fact, the assault is predicated upon their availability. This establishes a requirement for almost immediate installation within the objective area of whatever facilities may be necessary to permit their operation. There is also established a requirement for control and communication procedures immediately responsive to the needs of surface elements during the ebb and flow of battle. This makes critical the requirement for close, coordinated training efforts before initiation of an amphibious operation, and a maximum degree of mutual appreciation of their respective needs and capabilities between ground and aviation elements involved. This establishes the requirement for a top amphibious staff to be fully competent in the coordinated, complex, critical aspects of welding surface and air elements into one potent package. Here is the actual and proper area of effort for Marine Corps aviation.

Certainly, however, other aviation must operate successfully, or the amphibious operation may fail. This fact establishes a requirement for responsiveness to the needs of the overall operation. Still, there is no generic requirement that other aviation be based in the objective area if, in fact, it can accomplish its functions from bases elsewhere. More to the point, basing other than amphibious aviation outside the objective area, if practicable, would be an advantage in that it would require the enemy further to divide his defensive efforts. These other areas of air effort are the actual and logical spheres for certain Navy squadrons and elements of the Air Force, of course, in support of an amphibious operation. The character of co-ordination between these air operations and amphibious surface forces is much less direct than in the case of amphibious aviation. The utilization of other aviation, however, is a direct concern of the top amphibious staff and directly re-

**LtCol Keller** is a career Marine aviator who has long emphasized a closer integration of our Marine air and ground elements. At present he is with the staff at CINCSOUTH in Naples. Prior to that he has had billets with the Division of Aviation, HQMC, the Development Center and the Armed Forces Staff College.

lated to the ground-based air control system. This is the vital link between the operations of both types of aviation and the catalyst necessary to the overall success of the entire amphibious assault. There is thus established the requirement for developing the concept of a particular operation in full knowledge of the situation with which all aviation — amphibious or otherwise — will deal.

What conclusions, therefore, can be derived in consideration of the foregoing discussion? It appears the first major conclusion could be that the success of the amphibious operation henceforth will hinge directly upon the use of friendly air. The character of the amphibious assault will change from primarily a surface conceived, supported and executed operation to one which perhaps is conceived on the surface, but executed and supported in major degree through the air. This is a lesson which recent developments and logical cerebration on the subject teaches, and which must be studied, digested and used in timely fashion as the basis for creative thinking in tactics, techniques and strategy. This represents a goal toward which we must ever press, which must remain sharply and constantly in focus, as

we endeavor to maintain and improve our technical and professional competence in matters affecting amphibious aviation.

Consider for a moment this dual competency requirement — technical and professional. The equipment aspect of technical competence largely is circumscribed by the validity of equipment policies, initially, and by all the fiscal, research and development pitfalls which are so well known. An examination of Marine Corps equipment policies and programs, and the constant emphasis placed on up-dating them in conformance with technical and scientific progress, is comforting assurance that the Marine Corps is keenly aware of the importance of remaining on the right track in those regards. A case in point is the recent establishment in Headquarters Marine Corps of a billet for a Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development. However, it is not too difficult to ascertain some technically weak areas which do affect our amphibious aviation capabilities.

Many are well-recognized, e.g., limitations in certain radar and communication capabilities which exacerbate air defense and air control difficulties; vulnerability of operations to at least impedance by skill-

#### *Aviation elements must be immediately available in the assault*







***Two inseparable partners — neither ascendant, neither subordinate***

fully applied enemy electronic countermeasures; difficulties in airborne intelligence gathering, in point of timeliness and completeness; heavy supporting establishment requirements for modern air units, in point of weight and cube of equipments and supplies; airfield and airbase complex requirements. Very large, detailed and vital efforts are going forward in these technical problem areas, and their improvement is as inevitable as the passing of time—and largely a function of just that, as well as appropriations. However, other problem areas apparently have not been as generally appreciated as those exemplified immediately above. Consider this: It is not unusual for a single Marine aircraft wing to contain a dozen and a half different basic kinds of aircraft. Each contributes to the particular capabilities necessary to the mission of that wing. However, if the different types and models of aircraft could be reduced by a worthwhile factor, the saving in spare part inventories, technical training effort and specialized equipment would give major impetus to economy and flexibility in our aviation effort. A word of caution, however. No advocacy of economy at the expense of required capabilities should be inferred by the reader here. The deletion of an aircraft type merely to "save" is no real gain, if simultaneously a needed aviation capability is lost. However, taken in consonance with the overall aircraft programming of the Marine Corps and Navy, any net reduction achievable in the diversity of aircraft types in a Marine aircraft wing, which still retains required air means, would represent

a step forward in our abilities to fight in modern amphibious operations.

Another critical problem area revolves about our capabilities for training pilots in the technical aviation skill of high altitude gunnery, an essential aspect of improving our current air defense capabilities. Satisfactory high-speed, inexpensive, high altitude targets for air-to-air firing always appear to be, as prosperity once was, "just around the corner." There also, to some extent, lies our vitally important technical skill of putting fire on very high, very fast enemy aircraft. The consequences will be grave if we have not turned that corner before entering another conflict! Gunnery ranges, also, for air-to-air and air-to-ground firing practice are getting more and more critical as aircraft performance improves, various communities expand to include previously sparsely populated areas and commercial air travel grows in the country's air lanes. It is, in fact, becoming increasingly difficult to accomplish the desired, even minimum, amount of training in such basic aviation combat capabilities. These examples are illustrative of the fact that technical competence, although eternally pursued, never is attained absolutely nor permanently.

Is our present program optimum in deciding upon priorities of training goals, in efficiently handling complicated training efforts, in getting the most effective contribution from each Marine in technical military occupational specialties affecting amphibious aviation? Perhaps no categorical answer can be given these questions, since individual

opinions will vary. Certainly substantial progress has been made in recent years, with much remaining to be done. However, it must be realized that here is a problem not unique either to Marine aviation or the Marine Corps as a whole. The present era well could be characterized as the era of the technician. With the impedimenta of war being packaged more and more in "black boxes," with skill-level requirements in the Armed Forces, as in most modern organizations, generally rising on a constant curve, the full satisfaction of technical skill requirements appears unlikely for years to come. The overall desirability of a career in the Marine Corps is important to this problem. Such approaches as special technician pay, at this writing being studied for the Department of Defense by the Cordiner Committee, underline the generality of this difficulty as well as point toward possible partial solutions. There is, however, no one magical solution to our technician needs. Only a hard, constant program of making technicians into Marines and Marines into technicians gives any promise of fulfilling at least minimum requirements in the field of amphibious aviation, or elsewhere.

Now, let us turn to the question of professional competence in amphibious aviation, i.e., the competence which we possess within the Marine Corps to employ wisely and well in battle the technical aviation resources which we have developed. The best of equipment, the most highly trained technicians in themselves cannot guarantee that our side will prevail over a determined enemy. These varied resources must be related carefully to an overall pattern. Every man, every piece of equipment has a place into which they must be put to construct the grand mosaic of victory. The formulation of the pattern, the supervision of its function, these are the tasks of professional competence.

Commandant's policy for many years has given uncommon emphasis to the importance of reciprocal familiarity and full appreciation of their respective capabilities and limitations between aviation and

ground elements of the Marine Corps. This has served to illustrate that professional competence in amphibious aviation is not a requirement merely for those in aviation organizations. Significant increases in hours devoted to instruction in aviation subjects in the curricula of the Marine Corps Schools reflects this fact. The intermixing of both aviation and ground officers on staffs and in agencies which were notable in bygone times for lacking one or the other, is proceeding apace. From Headquarters Marine Corps to squadrons and battalions, this trend is apparent. It also is apparent that this trend will continue, as it must if the Marine Corps is to meet the challenge of the near future. It is here perhaps that each officer and NCO best can interpose his directly personal effort. Each Marine, to a degree consistent with his personal authority and employment, must

gain the fullest possible appreciation of the Marine Corps' air resources. Moreover, it is fundamentally important that no one misconstrue the role of aviation in the Marine Corps, either by overrating or underrating it. The Marine Corps is uniquely fortunate among fighting organizations to possess the balanced team capability which it has.

Neither partner to the Marine Corps whole is ascendant. Neither is subordinate. Each is equally important. Without Marine ground, Marine aviation loses its purpose and could not be sustained as a military force in its present form. Without Marine aviation, Marine ground could not maintain its traditional unique readiness to fight successfully, whenever, wherever and against whomever our national safety may require.

This leads us to the second and final major conclusion which can be

derived from the foregoing discussion of amphibious aviation. It is, that we have a major continuing task to maintain and improve our technical and professional competence affecting amphibious aviation, throughout the entire structure of the Marine Corps. The efficacy of our approach to modern methods for modern amphibious warfare will have a prime influence upon our value as a trim, efficient, potent element of the United States Defense Establishment. Each of us has a contribution to make in that regard which, compounded, will result in more effective amphibious aviation. This, in turn, will ensure that our Corps will continue to exert its salutary influence in support of our country and the democratic aspirations of the Free World. To no better purpose could we turn our reasoning powers, our loyal efforts, our undying dedication. US MC



### Easy Does It

FOLLOWING THE IWO JIMA campaign in 1945, I was ordered to the Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia. As a Gunnery Sergeant, I stood Commander of the Guard watches for a couple of months before being assigned duties as the first sergeant of the company.

During one tour as Commander of the Guard, I was inspecting the magazine area during the hours of challenging. As I approached the last post, the sentinel ordered, "Halt!" I stopped the vehicle immediately.

"Dismount and advance to be recognized," he ordered. I walked in a line directly toward the sentry, and without a word he permitted me to approach within 4 feet of him. In exasperation I stopped and stared at him.

Still no comment from the sentry. At this point I raised my voice and asked, "Well, what do you say?"

He replied with a classic I'll never forget, "Oh, nothing much, what do you say?"

MSGT F. R. Babcock

### A Slip Twixt Cup and Ship

ON THE WAY TO KOREA our troop ship docked overnight in the Japanese port of Kobe. The men streamed ashore for a last liberty, but I got the "lucky slip" out of the hat, so midnight found me standing the duty, awaiting the returning troops.

The Captain of the ship personally instructed me that an alcoholic shakedown would be conducted on each individual coming back aboard. One of the last to straggle in was a grizzled old Gunny. He was having a hard time making it up the ramp, mainly because of the fact that he was grasping a large, bulky sack in both hands. From 20 yards away it was obvious, because of the clanking noise being emitted, that the sack was chock full of some type of "medicinal aid."

When the Gunny spotted me he drew up short, his red eyes looking me over. "Request permission to come aboard," he gasped.

"What's in the sack Gunny," I inquired.

He thought for a second and then replied: "Japanese sandals, Sir."

I thought for a minute and then asked him: "I've never seen any Japanese sandals Sergeant, what's chances of taking a peek at yours?"

He stood there for a long minute, and then started forward. Suddenly he "slipped" and the sack sailed over the rail, crashing with a loud noise into the water below.

"Too bad Gunny," I said, "bet they were expensive sandals."

"No loss, Sir" said he, "damn things probably didn't fit anyway!"

Capt J. W. Hanker

(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)





## How to cool a pilot in the Thermal T




*The Douglas X-3,  
used in heat  
dispersion studies.*

With aircraft that top 1000 mph now in military service, the problem of *heat dispersion* gets growing attention from Douglas engineers.



Once called the heat barrier, science now uses a more accurate term, *thermal thicket*. The faster you fly through the earth's atmospheric blanket, the further into the thicket you get . . .

At Mach 2, twice the speed of sound, a plane's skin temperature can reach 275°F. At Mach 3 it leaps to 650°F, and at Mach 5 hardened steel wilts like lettuce . . .

Douglas is attacking this heat problem on many fronts. Air conditioners powerful enough to cool a theater were tested in the famous X-3 research plane seen at left. In current Douglas missiles, amazing advancements are being made in the design of heat-resisting materials and structures. This knowledge will speed the solution of the thermal thicket problem for piloted aircraft.



l Thicket



The Douglas Aero-rotor, an instrument that blasts out high velocity gas at temperatures upward of 3000 degrees Fahrenheit, helps in research for materials to withstand high temperatures and jet velocity erosion. Other work now on the boards at Douglas ranges from designs for the practical application of atomic power to the complete design and building of inter-continental missiles — and even includes the engineering for a space platform first considered as early as 1946.





# SUSTAINED HELICOPTER FLIGHT

A report of its physical and psychological effects on pilots

Capt R. G. Witwer, MC USN  
Lt C. W. Metcalf, MC USNR

TWO PILOTS ATTACHED TO HMX-1, MCAS, Quantico, Virginia, took off early in the morning of 13 September 1956 in an HO4S type helicopter with the purpose in mind of determining the feasibility of long range flights without refueling. The aircraft was fitted with an auxiliary fuel cell and means to add oil to the crankcase. Areas to be investigated included wear on components such as the rotor head and tail rotor.

In view of the fact that the flight was anticipated to be of approximately 13 hours' duration, the flight surgeons decided to check the pilots for wear and tear at the same time. Both were given complete pre-flight and immediate post-flight physical examinations, including electrocardiograms, circulatory efficiency, visual and hearing tests.

The pilots were 23 and 26 years of age respectively, and both found to be in excellent physical condition. They were permitted to use any means they desired to improve their physical comfort during flight, but were cautioned not to take any medical stimulants.

Post flight physical examination revealed no abnormalities other than the expected fatigue, moderate aching and marked hearing loss. In fact, their visual acuity showed some improvement. Total duration of the non-stop flight was 13.2 hours.

According to the officers, the principal causative factor of their fatigue was the constant noise level of the helicopter and the two radios. Radio range beacons were flown, necessitating constant listening by one pilot or the other. After a few hours, they became more or less accustomed to the noise level, but as the flight progressed, they had to shout through their intercoms to converse. One developed a headache during the last few hours of flight which was moderate and partially relieved by aspirin. This persisted, and several hours following the flight was described as "a loud dull roar, pierced by a shrill whining." This noise

was still heard the next morning and was identified with the audiometer as approximately 1,500 cps.

Hearing tests revealed only a slight transient loss of whispered voice in one pilot, but the audiometric findings were rather startling. Total hearing loss in the frequencies tested was 235 and 260 decibels respectively, with an average loss of 21 dbs. in each frequency. Audiometric readings returned almost to normal 18 hours later, and were above normal 4 days following completion of the flight. One pilot used cotton ear plugs during the flight with little apparent effect.



Bodily comfort was greatly enhanced by the use of special seat cushions of small spring construction with a fiber plastic covering, such as is commonly used in automobiles. Both pilots were highly enthusiastic about these pads, comparing them most favorably over the usual seat pads and with the sponge rubber cushions used in the HOK. One developed an aching just under the rib cage, both front and back, ascribed, in part, to leaning forward in order to rest the control hand on one knee.

The low point of mental fatigue was reached during the fifth hour of flight when they experienced a "sinking feeling" with the realization that many long hours of flying were ahead. Later their spirits became progressively more elevated, until at the end of the flight they felt almost elated and would have liked to continue despite the fact that they were physically fatigued.

There was almost a complete lack of appetite during and shortly after the flight, although no nausea was experienced.

Perhaps the most pertinent comment was made by the pilot who had made several flights of long duration at the time of the Tampico disaster, "When you have a good enough reason to fly that long, you don't get tired."

US & MC



# AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



**IN ASIAN WATERS**—Aboard the U. S. Navy aircraft carrier *Boxer* off the coast of Japan, sonar-equipped Sikorsky HSS helicopters carry out anti-submarine


exercises. The commercial version of this helicopter, the S-58, is active offshore in the Gulf of Mexico flying men and material to oil drilling rigs.



**ANTARCTIC OPERATIONS** prove the ability of versatile Sikorsky helicopters to work under extremes of climate and under unusually difficult maintenance conditions. Here a Sikorsky HO4S, one of four with Task Force 43, lands beside the icebreaker *Glacier* to pick up cargo.



**AT FORT RUCKER, Alabama**, the Sikorsky H-37A is being service-tested by the U.S. Army Aviation Board. Data on maintenance and logistics will be gathered, in preparation for the time when the Army flies large fleets of these twin-engined helicopters, each able to carry 26 combat-ready troops.



**SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT**


BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT

One of the Divisions of United Aircraft Corporation



# THE INFANTRY IN ATOMIC WARFARE

**In spite of the changes engendered by the advent of atomic weapons, we must never overlook the fact that the foot soldier is still the final and decisive element in battle**




**By MajGen J. H. Harper, USA**

*Effects data utilized in this article are based entirely upon the following unclassified publications: The Effects of Atomic Weapons, GPO 1950, and Radiological Defense, Vol II, AFSWP, 1951.*

IN VIEW OF THE MAGNITUDE OF the destructive effects of atomic weapons, the capability of a potential enemy to use these weapons requires the development of organization and employment techniques that will enable ground forces to live, should these weapons be used on the battlefield. At the same time, however, these same forces must be prepared to fight a conventional war, should these weapons not be used.

At The Infantry School the problem of developing organization, equipment, and methods of employing forces on the atomic battlefield has been the subject of continuous study for a considerable period. From this study has developed a broad concept of how we would fight a war under the threat of enemy use of atomic weapons.

It appears obvious that any capability by an enemy to deliver atomic weapons will render obsolete compact lines of defense and the large troop concentrations for offensive action which we have seen in the past. We envision comparatively small, powerful, highly mobile



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forces, capable of semi-independent operations for prolonged periods. In the offense, these forces will operate over extensive areas with large intervals between units. Being highly mobile, these forces will be able to concentrate rapidly from widely dispersed positions, seize an objective and, just as rapidly, disperse again. These units will displace frequently to deceive the enemy and to avoid remaining at one location long enough to enable the enemy to deliver atomic weapons on them.

Defensive action will also be conducted on extended frontages, and in great depth, with these same forces organized into comparatively small mobile islands of resistance. These forces move about establishing islands of resistance on the most favorable terrain, with each island a power in itself, with all the means necessary to stay and fight at any location, if required, and to effect surveillance and control of the terrain between the islands. The destruction of any one of the islands does not threaten the defense as a whole because of the depth of the system. Elements in the forward defensive area are so located as to force the enemy into areas favorable to the defender. Once the enemy is in these areas, strong mobile forces from the reserve counterattack in conjunction with the fires of atomic weapons and the massed fires of conventional artillery.

The distances by which units must be dispersed under this concept are primarily dependent upon the sizes of weapons which a potential enemy can be expected to employ. In areas in which the safety of his own troops is no problem to the enemy, such as in our reserve and rear areas, the




Figure 1

weapons which he can use are limited only by the composition of his atomic stockpile and the capabilities of the delivery means available to him. While any currently potential enemy must be given the capability to deliver weapons of megaton yields, in view of the extent and nature of the effects of weapons of these yields, we feel that weapons employed in forward areas will not exceed high kiloton yields. We must disperse sufficiently to reduce vulnerability to these weapons to a reasonable minimum, if at all possible, and so that no more than one unit is damaged by a single weapon.

This requirement for dispersion of units becomes strikingly apparent

if we examine our current concept of defense. In Figure 1 we see an infantry division disposed in what we termed, prior to the advent of atomic warfare, the "ideal" form of position defense. Superimposed upon this schematic drawing is the area of destructive effects of a 20 kiloton weapon. The inner circle represents the area in which there is a reasonably high probability of casualties from the effects of this weapon. We shall call this distance from the point of burst the "damage radius." The outer circle represents the distance at which we feel effects levels will be completely tolerable or, at worst, a minor nuisance. This distance we shall call the "safety radius." There will, of course, be casualties in the area between the two circles, but with a relatively low probability; and for our purposes, the damage in this area can be regarded as bonus damage, not to be counted on. If the troops are in foxholes or tanks, these radii will, of course, be considerably smaller. In this article we have assumed our troops to be in the worst degree of protection—in the open, without thermal protection. It can be seen that the area of damage easily covers an entire regiment, with probable damage extending well into the areas occupied by battalions of adjacent units.


The following comparison of the damage and safety radii of 100 KT and 500 KT weapons with that of the 20 KT weapon, shown above, indicates clearly the extent to which the use of weapons of these yields could damage our division in this situation.

| Weapon Yield<br>(Kilotons) | Damage Radius<br>(Yards) | Safety Radius<br>(Yards) |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 20                         | 2,150                    | 3,325                    |
| 100                        | 4,300                    | 6,000                    |
| 500                        | 6,575                    | 9,200                    |

Figure 2

Obviously, we must spread out if we are to reduce the vulnerability of our units. If we maintain normal dispersion within regiments, but increase the intervals between regiments of the division to, say, 5 miles, we can materially reduce the vulnerability of the division. However, it

At the time this article was written, MajGen Harper was Commandant of the Infantry School at Ft Benning, Ga. The material contained in the article was taken from a classified lecture which Gen Harper delivered to the combined student bodies of the Junior and Senior Schools at MCS, Quantico. At that time, the Editor in Chief of the Gazette felt that the views expressed by Gen Harper would be of interest to all Marines because of their similarity to those held by the Marine Corps in general. This line of thought—along which the Army and the Marine Corps are now moving jointly—is the one which far-sighted Marine planners have been exploring since 1947. As a result, Gen Harper rewrote his lecture in article-form eliminating the still classified portions. He is now Chief, Joint US Military Assistance Group in the Philippines.








Figure 3

can be seen from Figure 3 that, even with dispersion such as this, too many troops are still massed in too small an area. A 500 KT weapon, properly placed, can still cripple the division, and a 20 KT weapon will easily render a regiment ineffective. In addition, with regiments dispersed in this manner, only 3 regiments in the division does not provide the required depth and flexibility to meet multiple directional threats. The dispersion of units to reduce the degree of vulnerability of the division to a reasonable minimum and, at the same time, to enable effective employment of units, imposes certain requirements relative to the organization and equipment of such units.

First, the units must be large enough to be capable of sustained, semi-independent operations for prolonged periods; but at the same time, because of the destructive effects of atomic weapons and the inherent vulnerability of a unit conducting independent operations, these units must contain no more than the essential elements required for such operations. Our study indicates that the basic combat element of the division should be an organic integrated battle group consisting of an infantry battalion or its equivalent with all necessary supporting arms (including tanks) and services. Basically, this unit is what we currently refer to as a battalion combat team. The infantry and airborne divisions would consist of a number of these versatile battle groups up to as many as, say 7 or 8, all responsive directly to the will of the division commander, or which could be grouped into combat commands,

tailored for specific missions. The basic difference between the infantry and airborne divisions is that the infantry division is equipped with tanks and certain other heavy non-airtransportable equipment, while the airborne division is not.

A number of such organizations, designed for the atomic battlefield, have been proposed, and in Exercise SAGEBRUSH one such organization was tested. The SAGEBRUSH division consisted of 8 infantry battalions and 2 tank battalions, with supporting arms and services organized in separate organizations directly under the control of the division commander. These units were grouped as required by the situation under 3 combat commands, so that the combat organization of the combat commands consisted essentially of well-rounded combat teams. Information has recently appeared in the newspapers that the 101st Abn Div has been reorganized into 5 integrated battle groups.

Although the interior arrangement of these organizations varies in details, all of them are based on either the integrated battle group or the combat command concept, and it appears that the optimum organization may be along one of these lines.

The employment of forces such as these, dispersed over great distances, will depend primarily on their ability to move, shoot and communicate. Mobility of units must be increased. This includes mobility by air transport as well as on the ground. The infantry must be capable of moving by foot, vehicle, or air, in any type of weather and in any type of climate or terrain, as the situation dic-

tates. If we disperse our forces widely, we must be able to move them rapidly to critical points on the battlefield where they can best influence the action. Reconnaissance units in particular must be capable of rapid movement to effect surveillance of the wide intervals between units. Distances will probably be such as to require air lift by helicopter or fixed wing aircraft which can land and take off from unprepared fields. On the ground, we need a light, armored, tracked vehicle which can protect the infantry against small arms fire, shell fragments and, to some extent, against the effects of atomic weapons, and which possesses far greater mobility than our current tanks and is airtransportable by assault aircraft.

With increased depth and dispersion on the battlefield, we will need supporting artillery weapons with reduced minimum ranges to enable them to provide close support from within a battalion or battle group perimeter, and increased maximum ranges to protect all units or to support offensive operations. We foresee the allocation of atomic weapons and delivery means down to and including the battalion combat team or integrated battle group.

Radio communications must be improved to control and support units operating under such dispersed conditions. This applies not only to radios providing communication from division and combat command levels to lower echelons, but also to those from battalion combat team or battle group to subordinate units. Our present radios do not provide the required range capabilities or reliability for this type of warfare. More rapid means of laying wire must also be developed.

Since our tanks are presently not airtransportable, there is a requirement for an airtransportable weapon capable of slugging it out with enemy heavy armor. For some time to come, it will probably be necessary to air lift infantry units without their tanks. We must give these air lifted units an antitank capability comparable to that of the tank to enable them to stay on the battlefield. These units should be very powerful defensive units, capable of sustained defensive combat, and which possess a powerful offensive capability as

soon as linked with their organic armor.

With wide intervals between units an increased surveillance capability will be required. In all kinds of weather, day or night, we must be able to detect enemy mass movements or enemy forces that may be attempting to infiltrate the gaps between our widely dispersed units. This indicates the need for additional reconnaissance forces as well as new and increased surveillance means. Most of the proposed organizations provide for a material increase in reconnaissance elements, some by as much as 3 times those in the current division organization. Fast moving "sky cavalry" reconnaissance units which move by air show great promise in effecting battlefield surveillance and patrolling between the widely dispersed battle groups and combat commands.

Logistical support of these highly mobile forces will be a major problem. It is probable that the only means of support for great periods of time will be by air, and we must be provided with the means to support these forces. Helicopters and convertiplanes used as supply vehicles will provide new flexibility and endurance to units operating independently. Logistical procedures must be streamlined to effectively support operations of this type. The numbers of different types and calibers of infantry weapons must be reduced. Weapons and ammunition must be reduced in weight not only for logistical purposes but also to increase mobility.

The organization and equipment of infantry units along these lines appears to offer the most satisfactory basis for a solution to the problem of dispersion and reduction of vulnerability of the division. Figure 4, using the division organization tested in Exercise SAGEBRUSH, shows our current concept of dispersion on the atomic battlefield. Battalions are separated by 5 miles; combat commands by 15 miles. These distances are felt to be the maximum in the foreseeable future from the standpoint of control and effective employment of forces in view of the present status of development of equipment and state of training of our troops. With dispersion such as this, combat commands are com-




Figure 4

pletely safe from a 500 KT weapon detonated between the combat commands. One such high yield can damage no more than one combat command. Battalions of a combat command will be only slightly damaged by a 100 KT weapon centered on the combat command, and probably will be capable of continuing operations. One 100 KT weapon can only incapacitate one battalion. Battalions will be completely safe from medium yield weapons, say 50 KT, dropped between battalions. It is obvious with dispersion such as this, quick concentration for attack or counterattack can only be effected by helicopter or other vertical take-off air vehicles. However, when our Army becomes more extensively equipped with light equipment and better vertical take-off aircraft, and all officers and men are fully aware of the problems of control in this type of extended warfare, then perhaps distances between units might have to become even greater if we are to survive on a battlefield where both unlimited nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would be used. This points out conclusively the urgent need for Army aviation.

Since integrated battle groups are essentially reinforced battalion combat teams, in organizations consisting of organic integrated battle

groups, the same principle applies—5 miles between battle groups, and if the groups are employed in combat commands, 15 miles between combat commands.

Our study of organization and techniques of employing forces is a continuing one. We recognize that the ultimate solution to these problems and that of dispersion for atomic or non-atomic warfare will require further study and testing of the theories that have been developed. But we feel we are headed in the right direction and are confident that the infantry will meet the challenge of nuclear warfare.

In spite of the advent of atomic weapons and the changes in organization, equipment and techniques of employing forces which it engenders, we must never overlook the fact that the role of the infantryman has not changed. He continues to be the final and decisive element in battle. The changes brought about by technological progress serve only to place increasing importance on the qualifications of the individual soldier. His job requires initiative and intelligence. He must be in top physical condition and he must be trained to perfection, for he is the one who, in the final analysis, must close with the enemy and complete the destruction of his forces.

USMC





☛ *The day may soon dawn* when the mortar platoon will have its own observation aircraft. The XROE-1 (above), developed by the Hiller Helicopters for the Navy Dept, has made its first flight. This craft, called a rotorcycle, is designed to be collapsed into an easily transportable 250 lb. package. The 18-foot rotor, located above the pilot's head, is powered by a 4-cylinder-opposed, 2-cycle, air-cooled gasoline engine. The antitorque tail rotor is located on a boom to the rear of the operator. The entire machine is held together by quick release pins and can be assembled by one man in 10 minutes. If adopted by the Marine Corps, it will be used for observation, liaison and small unit tactical maneuvers.

☛ *Officers and Staff NCOs* are now authorized to have French cuffs on service shirts. These shirts (both wool and cotton) will be available in Marine Exchanges this spring. Matching gold cuff links and tie clasp will be worn. General officers will wear distinctive links and clasps. The new cuffs are optional.

☛ *An errata sheet*, containing changes and corrections of errors in the *Marine Corps Drill Manual*, is now available. The sheet contains additions, changes and corrections to both the first and second editions of the *Drill Manual*. Address requests to Manual Editor, Box 1844, Quantico, Va. Enclose a self-addressed, stamped envelope and the Errata Sheet will be mailed to you free of charge.

☛ *The Russians* are reported to have developed a new series of air-to-surface guided missiles. They were developed by a group of German electronics experts and are designated Comet 1, 2, 3 and 4. The range of the Comet 4 is approximately 90 miles. It is guided for the first 60 miles of its flight by a beam guidance signal from the launching aircraft. The last portion is controlled by radar echoes from the target. These radar signals originate from the parent plane and constantly change frequencies so as to avoid jamming. The receiving apparatus aboard the missile adjusts automatically to accommodate for this.

☛ *The Army* is eliminating tank containers and wheels as a means of transporting liquids. Instead, they are now contemplating using an inflated, cylindrical, rubberized fabric, reinforced bag equipped with an axle and towing yoke. These bags, inflated with oil, water or gasoline, can be towed one after another, with a maximum number of 6 to the ordinary jeep. Each "rolling fluid transporter" will hold 500 gallons, or 4,100 lbs., when fully loaded. The transporters demonstrated their durability last summer when a group of them were towed 1,100 miles in Greenland.

☛ *The first flights* of the HUS helicopter (below) have been completed. This 12-passenger aircraft, powered by a single Lycoming-built Wright R-1820 engine, features automatic stabilization and a cabin capable of being quickly converted for use as a troop carrier or cargo ship. It has a 12-ton capacity and is equipped with a rescue hoist and an external cargo sling. Sikorsky has scheduled flight delivery of the initial units to the Marine Corps Air Facility at Santa Ana, Calif. in the near future. A quantity order has been placed for use as a troop and cargo carrier.



☛ *A policy of rotating* Marine tactical squadrons overseas has been adopted. This method maintains unit integrity and obviates the extensive retraining of personnel. As planned, 4 exchanges will take place each year. The first of these was that of VMF 235, Atsugi, Japan and VMF 334, Cherry Point, NC.

☛ *In Needed: a More Fundamental Antidote for "Nerve" Gas*, an article appearing in Abbott Laboratories' house organ, is found a report on medical research on possible cures for such poisoning. Present research promises to provide the answer to one of our most pressing military problems. These poisons, alkylphosphates, include some of our most potent chemical warfare gases. Military "nerve gases" owe their lethality to the inactivation of one of the enzymes controlling the automatic actions of the heart, blood vessels and gastro-intestinal system. Such a condition is now treated with atrophine. However, this has been found ineffective in treatment of cases suffering from extreme exposure to "nerve gases." A newly synthesized series of chemicals — oximes — has been shown to be effective in many, hitherto, hopeless cases.

In cases where exposure to one of the nerve agents has been sufficient to cause prostration, the initial treatment is the application of artificial respiration. In contaminated areas this can only result in an even more dangerous exposure. Now, however, it is possible to give artificial respiration by means of a device developed by the Army called a mask-to-mask resuscitator. It consists of 2 hose assemblies joined to an anesthetist-type oronasal mask and a standard gas mask cannister connected to the other. The inhalations of the operator fill the hose with purified air through the cannister. His exhalations force this air into the lungs of the victim. When the casualty must be carried, a tube is inserted into his windpipe to prevent the closing of the trachea and by sealing with the trachea prevents the flow of body fluids into the lungs which might cause drowning.

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# HOW HITLER FAILED AT MOSCOW

♦ HITLER'S FINAL BID TO CAPTURE Moscow was made in the first week of December 1941. Some of the Germans actually reached the suburbs of Russia's capital, but were soon forced to retire. In several places the German advanced troops showed signs of cracking from exhaustion and the pressure of Russian counterattacks. The following week these developed into a massive counteroffensive, and the whole German front facing Moscow was driven back—into a desolate and hard-frozen countryside that offered little shelter from the rigors of the Russian winter.

That check was the turning point of World War II. A more definite and obvious turn of the scales came a year later when Hitler's renewed offensive was broken at Stalingrad, while Rommel was driven back from Alamein, but the German chances of victory were never as strong in 1942 as they had been in 1941.

It has become clear, however, that Hitler had missed his best chance of victory over Russia before he made the bid for Moscow. By mid-July, within a month of launching his invasion, his Panzer forces had advanced to the Desna riverline, more than three quarters of the way from the frontier to Moscow, and shattered the bulk of the Russian armies facing them on that part of the front.

But on July 19 Hitler had issued a directive that showed he was more inclined to turn southward than to push on to Moscow—the course that was ardently desired and urged by Gen Guderian, who had led the Panzer drive along the Moscow highway.

Field Marshal von Brauchitsch,

the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, did not press the matter for the moment. He was a well-liked, but basically weak, man who tended to avoid clashes of opinion and was always ill at ease in dealing with Hitler. As the troops needed a pause for rest and refitting before making a fresh bound forward, he took that as a justification for putting off a decision—and a dreaded argument with the Fuehrer.

Moreover the leading German generals were far from agreement among themselves, and that hindered them from presenting a united front to Hitler.

When Hitler visited the headquarters of the Central Army Group on August 4, its commander, Field Marshal von Bock, emphasized the vital importance of an early move on Moscow, and Guderian said that he would be ready to start on August 15. On the other hand, the commander of the Southern Army Group, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, naturally tended to favor a concentration of effort on the southern sector, and his great reputation as a strategist added weight to his view.

Moreover, Field Marshal von Kluge, who commanded the Fourth Army in the center, took the same view and privately suggested that his army should be switched to reinforce the southerly thrust. He was influenced not only by military reasons but by his personal feelings. For he remarked to his chief of staff, Blumentritt: "It would mean that *we* should be under von Rundstedt instead of under von Bock." Telling me of this, Blumentritt explained: "Von Bock was a very difficult man

to serve, and von Kluge would have been glad to get out of his sphere. It was an interesting example of the *personal* factor in strategy."

These differences of view among the higher generals played into the hands of Hitler, who at this period of the war was still uneasily aware of being an amateur and anxious to fortify his strategic ideas with some weighty professional opinion outside his own staff. That had been seen the year before when, in a fit of caution, he took his fateful decision to halt the Panzer forces outside Dunkirk—a halt that enabled the British Army to escape by sea. For on that occasion he had only ventured to overrule the Commander-in-Chief after finding out that von Rundstedt and von Kluge agreed with his cautious inclination. It was curious that, in 1941, he once again found reinforcement in the same two men for an equally fateful decision.

After several weeks had slipped away in such discussions, the Chief of the General Staff, Halder, spurred von Brauchitsch to put forward proposals for a speedy advance on Moscow. Hitler retorted with a new and more definite directive on August 21, which began:

"I am not in agreement with the proposals submitted by the Army, on August 18, for the prosecution of the war in the East. Of primary importance before the outbreak of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but rather the occupation of the Crimea, of the industrial and coal mining area of the Donetz basin, the cutting of the Russian supply routes from the Caucasian oilfields. . . ."

Accordingly he gave orders that, to clear the way to these southern

objectives, part of von Bock's Army Group (including Guderian's Panzer forces) was to turn south and help to overcome the Russian armies around Kiev that were opposing von Rundstedt.

When these orders were received, Halder tried to get von Brauchitsch to tender their joint resignation. But von Brauchitsch said it would be a useless gesture, as Hitler would simply reject their resignation.

As for arguments, Hitler brushed these aside with the remark, which he often repeated: "My generals know nothing about the economic aspects of war." All that he would concede was that after the Russian armies in the Kiev area had been wiped out von Bock should be allowed to resume his advance on Moscow, and Guderian's Panzer forces returned him for the purpose.

The Kiev encirclement was in itself a great success, and raised rosy expectations. Guderian thrust downward across the Russians' rear while von Rundstedt's Panzer forces thrust upward. The two pincers met 150 miles east of Kiev, closing a trap in which 600,000 Russians were caught.

Hitler described it as "the greatest battle in the history of the world." Halder caustically remarked, though not to Hitler, that it was "the greatest strategic blunder in the Eastern campaign."

It was late in September before the battle ended, as poor roads and rainy weather had slowed down the pace of the encircling maneuver. The brightness of victory was darkened by the shadow of winter, carrying its historic menace to an invader of Russia. The German armies on the Central Front, facing towards Moscow, had been halted during the best two months of the summer. That proved fatal to their prospects of reaching their goal.

Von Bock's long-delayed advance started at last on 2 October. It was carried out by three armies and three Panzer groups—Guderian having hurried back from the south to play "outside right" in the team that was now setting out to win the "Moscow cup final."

When I interrogated Blumentritt after the war, he gave me a vivid account of the course of the offensive, as he saw it from his post as von

Kluge's chief of staff on the main line of advance: "The first phase was the battle of encirclement around Vyasma and Bryansk. This time, the encirclement was perfectly completed, and 600,000 Russians were captured. It was a modern Cannae—on a greater scale. The Panzer groups played a big part in this victory. The Russians were caught napping, as they did not expect a big drive for Moscow to be launched at such a late date.

"After the Russian forces had been rounded up, we pushed on towards Moscow. There was little opposition for the moment, but the advance was slow—for the mud was awful, and the troops were tired. Moreover, they met a well-prepared defensive position on the Nara River, where they were held up by the arrival of fresh Russian forces.

"Most of the commanders were now asking: 'When are we going to stop?' They remembered what had happened to Napoleon's army. Many of them began to re-read Caulaincourt's grim account of 1812. That book had a weighty influence at this critical time in 1941. I can still see von Kluge trudging through the mud from his sleeping quarters to his office, and there standing before the map with Caulaincourt's book in his hand. That went on day after day.

"The troops themselves were less depressed than their generals. They could see the flashes of the AA guns over Moscow at night, and it fired their imagination—the city seemed so near. They also felt that they would find shelter there from the bitter weather. But the commanders felt that they were not strong enough to push those last 40 miles."

On the higher levels a different view prevailed. This time it was not due to Hitler—contrary to what is commonly believed. He was becoming impressed, and depressed, both by the increasing difficulties and by the wintry conditions. On November 9 he sombrely remarked: "the recognition that neither force is capable of annihilating the other will lead to a compromise peace." That same day von Rundstedt had advocated breaking off the offensive for the winter, and pulling back to a good defensive line, in order to pre-

serve Germany's military strength. The commander of the Northern Army Group, von Leeb, took a similar view.

But von Bock urged that the German offensive must be continued. As von Rundstedt remarked in talking with me after the war: "Von Bock's nose was pointing towards Moscow"—and the scent was too strong for him to resist it. Von Bock argued that "both sides were calling on their last reserves of strength, and the one with the more determined will would prevail. Von Brauchitsch and Halder agreed with him—Halder telling a conference of the higher staff, on November 12, that there was good reason to believe that Russian resistance was on the verge of collapse."

Von Brauchitsch and Halder, as well as von Bock, were naturally the more reluctant to call a halt because of their earlier struggle in getting Hitler to accept their arguments for capturing Moscow rather than pursuing objectives in the south. Remembrance of past history also had a strong effect on their attitude—in a different way to what it had on the commanders at the front. While these were gloomily recalling what had happened to Napoleon's army in 1812, von Brauchitsch and Halder could not forget that in 1914 the German Army had forfeited its best chance of victory in World War I because their own predecessors in the Supreme Command had given up the Battle of the Marne as lost when they were within reach of winning it. That was just the kind of psychological point that appealed to Hitler, and it helped to bring him round to their view.

So orders were issued for a continuation of the push for Moscow, although its aims were modified. The plan had been that the spearheads were to by-pass the city and capture the railway junctions beyond—Guderian, on the right flank, had been given Gorki as his objective, a rail center 250 miles east of Moscow! After he and von Kluge had protested that such far-reaching objectives were a "fantasy," so late in the year, the plan was limited to the capture of Moscow—the "symbol" of Russian resistance. According to Blumentritt, the orders said that the



Kremlin was to be blown up, to signal the overthrow of Bolshevism.

The offensive was resumed on November 15, when there was a momentary improvement in the weather. The whole push for Moscow was placed under von Kluge's direction—which was rather an irony in view of his disbelief in the possibility of reaching the goal. His own Fourth Army was on the right wing, and soon came to a halt in face of mud, snow and Russian counterattacks. Hoepfner's Panzer group formed the principal striking force on the left wing. It managed to make considerable progress, though slowly, and on the 27th its 2d Panzer Div penetrated to Krasnaya Polyana, only 19 miles from Moscow—"far enough," Blumentritt said, "to get a sight of the Kremlin." But it could get no nearer.

Even von Bock came to doubt the value of trying to push on, although he had just previously been declaring: "The last battalion will decide the issue." But von Brauchitsch, from far in the rear, continued to insist that the offensive must be continued at all costs. He was a sick man, and desperately worried by Hitler's anger about the poor results achieved.

Von Kluge eventually agreed to make one more, and final, effort to reach Moscow. Blumentritt described the outcome to me: "The attack was launched on December 2d, but by afternoon reports were coming back that it was held up by strong Russian defenses in the forests west of Moscow. The Russians were artists in forest fighting, and their defense was helped by the fact that darkness came as early as 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

"A few parties of our troops, from the 258th Inf Div, actually got into the suburbs of Moscow. But the Russian workers poured out of the factories and fought with their hammers and other tools in defense of their city.

"During the night the Russians strongly counterattacked the isolated elements that had penetrated their defenses. Next day our corps commanders reported that they thought it was no longer possible to break through. Von Kluge and I had a long discussion that evening, and at

the end he decided to pull back these advanced troops. Fortunately the Russians did not discover that they were moving back, so that we succeeded in extricating them and bringing them back to their original position in fairly good order. But there had been very heavy casualties in those two days' fighting.

"The decision was just in time to avert the worst consequences of the general counteroffensive that the Russians now unleashed, and into which Marshal Zhukov threw a hundred divisions. Under their converging pressure our position became daily more dangerous. We had been badly misled about the quantity of reinforcements that the Russians could produce. They had hidden their resources all too well."

That ended the Germans' bid for Moscow—and was the last bid for it they ever made. Never again in the war did any of them have a glimpse of the Kremlin, except as prisoners.

Hitler had lost his chance of capturing Moscow by his August decision to halt the advance in that direction, and turn aside to clear a path into Southern Russia. The forfeit of Moscow was not compensated by what his armies attained in the south. After the great round-up at Kiev, von Rundstedt overran the Crimea and the Donetz basin, but was frustrated in his drive for the Caucasian oilfields. His troops succeeded in reaching Rostov on the Don, but in an exhausted state, and were soon pushed out by the Russians. He then wanted to fall back to a good defensive line on the Mius River, but Hitler forbade such a withdrawal. Von Rundstedt replied that he could not comply with such an order, and asked to be relieved of his command. Hitler promptly replaced him, but immediately after this the front was broken and Hitler was forced to accept the necessity of a retreat. That was in the first week of December—simultaneously with the repulse at Moscow.

That same week von Brauchitsch asked to be relieved on grounds of sickness, the next week von Bock did likewise, and a little later von Leeb resigned when Hitler rejected his proposal for a withdrawal on the northern front near Leningrad. So all the top commanders departed.

Hitler appointed no successor to von Brauchitsch, but took the opportunity to make himself the direct Commander-in-Chief of the Army. At Christmas he got rid of Guderian, the principal agent of his earlier victories, who had withdrawn his exhausted troops without Hitler's permission.

Guderian relates that Hitler told him: "You have been too deeply impressed by the suffering of the soldiers. You feel too much pity for them. You should stand back more. Believe me, things appear clearer when examined at long range." Guderian's comment is pungent: "Only a man who saw the endless expanse of Russian snow during this winter of our misery and felt the icy wind that blew across it, burying in snow every object in its path: who drove for hour after hour through that no man's land only at last to find too thin shelter with insufficiently clothed, half-starved men . . . can truly judge the events."

In the first week of January Hitler at last sanctioned a short withdrawal. Telling me of the conditions under which the German forces had to be extricated, Blumentritt said: "The roads were so deep in snow that the horses were up to their bellies. When the divisions withdrew, part of the troops had to shovel a path by day along the route their transport was to move by night."

That withdrawal gave the German Army the chance to withstand the pressure of the Russians—better acclimatized and equipped for such winter warfare. Even so, the German troops suffered terribly. No adequate preparations had been made to provide them with the necessary winter clothing, and vast numbers perished from the cold. Many divisions were reduced to barely a third of their establishment by the end of the winter. The German Army never fully recovered from this ordeal, while the Air Force suffered even worse in trying to keep up the bare minimum of supplies to the troops. Crashes were appallingly numerous. The toll paid in maintaining air supply to the many isolated positions on such a vast front was fatal to the future development of the Air Force.

USMC

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

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

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*Sea Duty* has taken on an additional combat vessel in the Navy's amphibious fleet. Marines combat-ready, prepared to lead the assault ashore by members of the 3d Bn, 5th Marines (1) shown here (2 & 3) had the unique experience of being on an carry assault troops. The ship's interior compartments troop berthing (4) and messing facilities (5), as well as elevators to eliminate the backbreaking toil by troops ammo (6) and water cans (7) topside prior to H-hour. Commanders embarked, helicopter control communications facilities (8) have been installed in the separate command room. Consequently, when the word is passed for Marine find the landing force commander confident of the the *Thetis Bay* in the transport group (10).

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


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# S BAY (CVHA-1)

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t. Marines embarked aboard the *Thetis Bay* are  
ult ashore by means of a vertical envelopment. The  
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# LIMITED WAR



By Col O. R. Simpson

## Introduction

UNTIL RECENT YEARS THERE HAS been no particular need to establish categories for wars. It was sufficient to describe them as "large" or "small" and even this often depended on whether the speaker was involved directly or a long range observer. However, the global magnitude of WWII and the advent of mass destruction weapons conditioned the thinking of many people — particularly Americans — to view all war as "total." Evidence of this was clearly seen in our public debates on national security of 1946-47 and 1949. Here we were preoccupied with our concern for establishing a defense structure with which to cope successfully with WWII — an "all-out," "no holds barred" conflict. The events of the last 10 years indicate some categorization would now be useful. There has been considerable armed conflict since 1945 but none of it has become "global" or "total." No nuclear weapons have been used in combat since Nagasaki. Yet we have not reached the millennium of world peace and do not appear likely to do so. While WWII and the "nuclear exchange" does not seem imminent, conflict goes on in various parts of the world and unquestionably will continue.

Thus it would be useful to have some commonly accepted designator which would be descriptive of that type of warfare which is less than global or total — that type where the fate of the world does not necessarily hang in balance.



## For the United States, Navy and Marine Corps elements are the forces best suited by mission, organization and training to go into action in such a conflict

There has been no dearth of terms. Lippman first used "cold war" in 1947 to describe the manifold activities short of actual war which were being used by the Soviet bloc in pursuit of its objective of world domination. After 1950, however, many found it hard to include the "hot" Korean conflict within the compass of "cold war." This was particularly difficult for those directly involved. President Truman's attempt to describe Korea as a "police action" lacked both accuracy and public acceptance.

A British writer, Brigadier Barclay, has proposed "New Warfare." This he defines as "the means by which a nation or group of nations seeks to impose its will on others by all means short of war and without disturbing its own economy to an extent unbearable or unacceptable to its people." In his term, he includes the activities of Lippman's "cold war"—propaganda, sabotage, intimidation, armed threat, etc.—and also "war by proxy on a limited scale."

### Limited War

Of all the many terms which have been employed to describe that warfare which is something less than general or total, "limited war" seems to be the most accurate and thus the most useful. "Limitation" in scope, objective, means—or combinations of these—is the predominant characteristic of this type of warfare. The limitation may be practiced by either or both belligerents. Whether

the war is limited or not depends on who is establishing the category. The Republic of Korea, for example, having had the "rake of war dragged up and down its country for years" could scarcely be expected to view that war as limited. But certainly to the US it was limited—in scope, objective and means employed. It should perhaps be noted that all the various terms of limitation are useful only to those who enjoy the sanctuary of the detached observer. To the man being shot at, there is nothing at all limited about his war.

If some form of limitation can be accepted as the most significant characteristic of this form of warfare then a reasonable definition of Limited War might be:

"War of limited scope in which either or both belligerents have limited objectives and employ limited means."

The interrelation of limited objectives and limited means is at once apparent. A limited objective suggests limitation of the means to attain it. Limitation may well stem from the fear that failure to impose positive restrictions will precipitate unlimited or global war—such as was true of the US position in Korea.

### Background

Limited wars are not new. Most wars of early military history were really "small wars" because the economy of the time would not support large armies in the field. Hastings (1066), often classed as one of the

world's great battles, involved only 18,000 men about equally divided between the Normans and the Saxons. As economies and communications systems developed, the size of opposing armies grew. By 1812, Napoleon was able to invade Russia with 350,000 men. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 involved 850,000 men and finally in WWII some 30 million people were under arms.

The US has declared war only 6 times: 1775, 1812, 1861, 1898, 1917 and 1941. Of these, 1812 and 1898 were limited wars in the sense of the definition proposed here. A quick look at these shows a pattern which, with proper modification, fits present day limited wars.

Our second war with England (1812-1815) had a limited objective largely concerned with economic considerations. The country was divided as to the merits of the war—and this is true of most limited wars. Soldiers were enlisted for very short terms—often only 6 months. This precipitated a requirement for units actually engaged in combat to be relieved without replacement in order to meet discharge dates—a circumstance repeated in every limited war which followed including Korea 138 years later.

In our war with Mexico in 1845, we suffered because we had no "ready force." The same was true in 1898 in the Spanish American War. During the period 1918-1932, the US employed its Marines as instruments of national policy in Haiti, Nica-





**Col Simpson's** conviction that our country is preparing for the wrong war in this nuclear age is shared by many other professional soldiers. In presenting his views here he draws on his experience of over 20 years' service. Commissioned from Texas A&M in 1936, he has served in various staff and command billets including command of the 1st and 6th Marines. Now at

HQMC, he has attended the Command and General Staff School at Ft Leavenworth and the Army War College.

ragua and Santo Domingo. While these were not really wars except to the individuals involved, many of the characteristics of limited warfare were present.

While we were not again involved in limited war until Korea in 1950, this type of conflict went on elsewhere: 1935, Italy-Ethiopia; 1936-39, Spanish Civil War; 1946, Greece; 1947-48, Arab-Israeli; 1948, Malaya; 1946-1954, Indochina.

Korea, 1950-53, was our most recent and most extensive venture in the field of limited war. The results are none too reassuring. This was a true limited war from the US standpoint—we had a limited objective (while there are grounds for disagreement as to what the objective was, it was a limited one by any standard); we were desperately anxious to keep the scope limited and accordingly we put a definite limitation on the means we employed. It is a characteristic of limited war that political (in the broad sense) considerations dominate military considerations.

We had difficulty in Korea because we had no military posture to cope quickly and adequately with limited war. We had a nuclear retaliatory force which admirably served the purpose of deterring WW III, but we had starved the forces which fight limited war and we had done no serious thinking, either militarily or as a nation, about our possible involvement in limited wars.

Starting practically from a prone position, the nation did a creditable job of rising to its knees and eventually to its feet—militarily. To do this, the expedients and improvisations to which we resorted were many and varied. While the ability to improvise is undoubtedly one of our strong virtues, reliance on it rather than adequate prior planning and preparation may one day lead to difficulties of such magnitude that no degree of improvisation can provide salvation.

These are important points to remember about our Korean experience:

a) Korea was a true limited war from the US standpoint.

b) For Soviet Communism, this was "war by proxy." Russia succeeded in remaining technically neutral while persuading the North Koreans and the Chinese to fight for her interests.

c) The US was totally unprepared to fight a limited war. A major effort was required on our part for even a questionable measure of success.

d) In making this effort, the US found it necessary to invoke measures usually reserved for general war and which cannot be repeated with impunity for future limited wars. (This was particularly true in the involuntary mobilization of Reserves.)

e) If we had to be involved in limited war in 1950, we were fortunate to have it in Korea. Elsewhere we would have had far more difficulty in keeping it "limited."

From our Korean experience alone—to say nothing of our long and varied experience in other limited wars, it would seem prudent to take a careful look at the prospect for our future involvement in this type conflict and determine the preparations we should make for this contingency.

#### Limited War of the Future

In attempting to assess the likelihood of our future involvement in limited wars, we face one hard and unpalatable fact. Soviet Russia may have more to say about whether the US will again engage in limited war than the US itself. We have identified our national interests and announced our determination to defend them. Unless we retreat from that position, Russia can, by her actions, determine whether our protection of these interests will involve war.

The ultimate goal of Communism

is world domination. The tenacity with which International Communism adheres to this goal is nothing short of remarkable. Defeats, military, political and economic—are all viewed as only temporary detours in the course of overall progress. This attitude is totally incompatible with the US desire to live and prosper according to our own dictates in a world of peace. It would seem to place the two foci of world power in conflict until such time as the fundamental objective of one or the other is changed.

Since WWII, the USSR has demonstrated to our bitter satisfaction that she has a complex pattern of methods for use in pursuing her goals. She is skilled in the application of propaganda, subversion, appeals to nationalism, infiltration, armed threat, war by proxy and, of course, general war. The USSR is currently employing all these except general war in a wide variety of places across the globe. And before she will abandon her goal of a Communist dominated world, she will employ general war if this seems necessary and if it appears to offer a reasonable chance for success.

With the specific exception of the Korean war years of 1950-53, we have devoted most of our defense effort to insuring that no antagonist of ours can anticipate any "reasonable chance of success in general war." We have developed a Strategic Air Command and armed it with thermonuclear weapons of incredible power. We have entered into a series of collective security agreements—NATO, SEATO and the like—designed on the one hand to reassure our allies and the other to warn our Communist opponents that aggression will bring disaster in the form of nuclear—"massive"—retaliation.

But, during this time, the USSR has also developed mass destruction weapons and the means to deliver them. This has brought about the curious situation in which the two centers of world power have the capability to destroy each other. The specter of "thermonuclear holocaust" has given the world more cause to ponder its ultimate fate than any other single event in the last several centuries. Churchill has spoken of it as "roaming and peering around

the rim of Hell." In the case of the Communists, there can be assumed to be no reluctance in pushing their enemies into "the pit" but there would be a natural reluctance — even on the part of Communists — to being dragged in after them. There seems to be now a growing acceptance of the fact that there will be no victors in thermonuclear war — only survivors.

This situation has been described as "nuclear stalemate." Regardless of the accuracy of this, the fact is that WWII has not yet started and the prospects for it are gratifyingly dim. This does not mean any fundamental change in the objectives of Communism. It only means that it is not to the interests of the Communists to precipitate a general war. It is a situation that can be prolonged a very long time provided we maintain the appropriate form and magnitude of deterrent power.

But in dealing with the major threat we have not eliminated or even stalemated armed conflict as such. On the contrary, we may well have set the stage for more numerous small wars. Liddell Hart has observed that "to the extent that the H-bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibilities of 'limited war.'" This stems from the fact that if, as it appears, we have an effective deterrent for general war, this has not altered the objective of world domination as the goal of Communism. Since general war is only one of the means available, the Communists can be expected to give full attention to the others which promise more success — subversion, infiltration, armed threat and limited war. We have yet to develop an effective deterrent for these.

On balance it seems reasonable to expect that the world will see many limited wars in the future. It would be foolhardy to assume that we will be able to avoid direct involvement in every instance. It would be even more foolish to pattern our national defense structure on such a premise. The choice in all probability, will not be ours — unless the alternatives of abandoning our national objectives or engaging in limited war is considered a choice. It is difficult to imagine how we could maintain our integrity as a nation and still consider such a course of action — or

inaction.

It is all very well to say that we must never again become involved in another "Korea." The only way to be absolutely certain that we will never again be involved in limited war is to announce that we will never fight again under any consideration. This could effectively prevent our engagement in war and would, at the same time, surrender the Free World — including the US — to Communist domination. Thus it would seem that reality would cause us to acknowledge that there will undoubtedly be limited wars in the future and that there is an ever present possibility that we will become involved in them.

It has been argued that the US should fight these wars "by proxy" in the same manner as the USSR. This is not easy for us to do. War by proxy is a part of an overall pattern of aggression which this country cannot, in all conscience, embrace. We do have it as a basic policy that the countries most directly threatened will make maximum effort on their part as a condition of our assistance — as witness the 20 ROK divisions. We have Military Advisory Assistance Groups in many areas, but progress is painfully slow and expensive. Since the Communists clearly have the initiative in these matters of aggression, it can be presumed that they will move in an area where our preparations are least advanced. Circumstances may well make necessary the commitment of US combatant elements in future limited wars as they have done in the past. Certainly we must attempt, with all practicable means consistent with our position, to avoid being drawn needlessly into a limited war. But common prudence and a reasonable sense of history dictate that we recognize that our direct participation may be required in limited wars of the future.

We must thus ensure that our national defense structure contains the elements to cope with limited wars. There is a view that "if we take care of the big ones, the little ones take care of themselves." This is dangerous oversimplification. SAC, regardless of its virtue in its designed role of deterring and winning WWII was far from decisive in the limited war of Korea. Certainly no one

would argue that we should weaken or jeopardize the forces designed for general — total — war. Here we must have the best we can devise and afford. But this does not automatically provide for limited wars and it puts a premium on forces that are effective in either kind of war.

A look at some of the characteristics of limited wars and the forces required to wage them successfully gives a reasonable yardstick for assessing our capabilities in this field:

1) Limited wars may be nuclear or non-nuclear. Any general war can be assumed to involve nuclear weapons on a massive scale. But this is not true of limited war. It might well be that it would not be to the advantage of either side to employ nuclear weapons. The fact that nuclear weapons were not employed or that their use was greatly restricted might well be one of the "limitations" of a limited war. (One of the most difficult problems in limited war is keeping it "limited." Nuclear weapons complicate this problem enormously and whether a two-sided nuclear war could be limited in any form is, at the very least, open to serious question.) In any event, forces for limited war must have the capability for combat under nuclear or non-nuclear conditions. A limited war may, and probably will, start with non-nuclear weapons. However, the threat of nuclear weapons will always be present. The combat elements which ignore this threat are inviting disaster.

2) The nation cannot afford two defense structures — one for general war and one for limited war. The structure must be designed to deter general war and to win it should deterrence fail. This structure must include the elements to cope successfully with limited war. These elements must, of course, have the capability of contributing to the general war effort.





3) Limited wars are fought primarily on the ground and, thus, ground forces are the primary elements in the force structure. Tactical air support is the second essential element. Included must be the capability for battlefield mobility by both helicopter and transport aircraft. Naval forces are required in many forms. The Navy must control the sea lines of communication, move the bulk of the ground elements and much of the air elements to the area of operations. In addition, the Navy is required for carrier air support, amphibious assault and shore-to-shore movement. In short, limited wars require balanced forces.

It should be noted that there is a theory held by many responsible people, that naval and air forces with nuclear weapons should be our principal contributions in limited war. This view holds that we must avoid involvement of ground forces at almost any cost. This is theory. It sounds good but it lacks substance and reality. There is no combat experience to support it and much to deny it. The weight of evidence supports the opinion that effective intervention in limited war means a balanced force built around an effective ground combatant element.

4) Successful prosecution of limited wars requires "ready forces." Mobilizing the necessary forces after the initiation of limited war means, at best, prolonging the conflict and, at worst, risking early defeat. Readiness is a virtue so widely recognized as to be a "truism." In the past our Services have given much "lip service" to this concept but insufficient positive attention. Forces for limited war must be ready in fact as well as in name. They cannot be merely a statistic in a mobilization plan. If the war is to remain limited and we are not to lose it, our forces must be ready to move immediately to the point of trouble.

5) In addition to the normal forms of land combat, limited wars may involve amphibious assault, airborne, or air-transported or other forms of special operations. Usually it is a war of movement covering relatively large areas. This indicates a requirement for highly skilled forces thoroughly trained for land combat and capable of independent operations by small units.

6) Readiness implies mobility. Ready forces on the West Coast are of little use for a limited war in Southeast Asia unless they can move quickly to the scene and in a manner which permits them to enter combat on arrival. The forces must be able to rapidly and efficiently employ both sea and air transport — and that transport must be available in reasonable quantities.

7) The maintenance of forces which can engage effectively in limited war coupled with a national will to use them where required should serve as a form of deterrent to any intended aggressor. Under some circumstances these forces might be deployed to the general area of trouble prior to the outbreak of hostilities. "Showing the flag" — or, more realistically, showing positive intent — has prevented the outbreak of hostilities in the past and may do so in the future.

Even this brief and incomplete listing is sufficient to clearly indicate a requirement of this nation for a "force in readiness." It should be a balanced force of both ground and air elements with appropriate naval support. It must be prepared for nuclear and non-nuclear war — both offensively and defensively. It must be a highly skilled, thoroughly professional force. It must have expert leadership and a fine edge of esprit de corps — since it can be expected to face unknown situations in un-reconnoitered areas and since it may well be called on to fight "unpopular" wars. Of greatest importance is the requirement of readiness to move without reorganization or augmentation of personnel or materiel.

This force need not — and indeed should not be labeled a "limited war force," "special force" or any other trick name. It must be an organic element of basic national defense structure.

While the qualifications described here are by no means the exclusive property of the Marine Corps, it would be difficult to describe better the characteristics of the Fleet Marine Forces. Almost since its inception, the Marine Corps has served as a force in readiness for this nation. The "Fire Brigade" is part of the tradition of the Corps. Marines have served in combat for months and years in response to the nation's in-

terest in campaigns that were never titled as wars — limited or otherwise. Yet in the instances where the nation has engaged in struggles for survival — general war — the Marines fitted effectively into the overall national effort.

As elements of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, the Marine air-ground task forces are the ideal organizational forms for the conduct and control of limited wars. Where the national interests requires intervention in these conflicts, the Fleets, with their assigned Fleet Marine Forces, are the proper instruments of national policy. Most of the areas where limited wars are likely to start are accessible from the sea. Thus seapower in its full dimensions can be employed. Of all nations, the US alone is in a position to exploit the vast potential of seapower. In projecting this power from the sea onto the land, the Fleet Marine Forces will be critical elements.


This is not meant to imply that the Navy-Marine Corps elements can or should be assigned exclusive responsibility for limited wars. Nevertheless these are the forces which by mission, organization, experience and training are the ones best suited to initiate action in these conflicts.

There is much to support the belief that this is the proper modern-day role of the Marine Corps. A force in readiness prepared to move on a moment's notice to any spot on the globe required in the nation's interest. A force prepared for immediate intervention in limited war or to take its place in the overall effort of general war.

This is the opportunity for the modern Marine Corps. But this coveted role will not go to the Marine Corps simply because the Corps exists. The Corps must earn it; it must be alive and dynamic — a modern fighting arm, constantly moving forward, constantly evolving new techniques and new ideas. Pointing to Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima is not enough. These are pages of glorious history, but history will win no wars for the nation in 1957, 1960 or 1975.

For the Marine Corps this is both an opportunity and a challenge. In 182 years of proud history we have faced no greater opportunity — and no greater challenge. US MC

By Col A. M. Fraser



# Gentlemen . . . Dinner is Served

*"We few, we happy few, we band of brothers"—King Henry V.*

THE PRACTICE OF HOLDING formal stag dinners in Marine Corps messes is growing. There are descriptions or discussions of such affairs in almost every issue of the GAZETTE. There is much conversation about the merits of the custom and its place—if any—in the American Services. The amount of interest shown would seem to prove that "mess night" or "guest night" dinners satisfy some sort of need.

The gathering of a group whose members have some common interest or characteristic is a natural and ancient practice. The shared traditions, ideals and dangers of the military life have made such affairs a natural concomitant of service. There are no other professions whose members can repeat to one another, without selfconsciousness or embarrassment, the line spoken by Henry V on the eve of Agincourt and quoted above. The growth of formal institutions and practices which

acknowledge the particular nature of military service is a desirable thing.

In the Marine Corps one often hears two objections to the guest night idea. First, there is some disapproval of the stag nature of these gatherings. There is no need to debate the place of the ladies in military social life. It is well established and widely understood. At the same time, there is no reason for assuming that mixed gatherings satisfy all needs. Take a close look at the



groups at the next large cocktail party. Quite beyond this, the formal gathering of men, in an atmosphere of dignity and tradition, makes a definite contribution to the unity and esprit of an organization.

There is also some feeling that this practice is an alien one, transplanted to these shores by a few proponents who became interested in the idea while serving abroad. It is true that certain noble social experiments in our recent history (now repealed) tended to inhibit some of the more venerable forms of social intercourse, but this was not always so. The histories of the Marine Corps and of the United States Navy include many examples of formal military dinners at which officers entertained distinguished visitors and enjoyed one another's company.

All this is not intended to argue that the British didn't do it first. Guest night dinners and formal dining in wardrooms and messes have been a British practice for a very long time. It is reasonable to assume that such practices transferred into the American Services with no self-conscious jolt or sense of larceny. It is interesting to speculate on just how much of our body of military customs has foreign origins. Stripped of all such items, the American military framework would probably be a most peculiar looking skeleton. Larceny, like illegitimacy, acquires respectability with age. If we must feel that this pleasant practice was borrowed from the British, let us remember that it happened a long time ago and the statute has run.

A few examples of such affairs from our own history are in order. The early part of the last century was an era of great patriotic feeling. The Fourth of July and other patriotic occasions were the setting for much celebrating in the Nation's capital.

The *National Intelligencer*, as quoted by McClellan, reported a gathering in Washington in 1816 in these words: "A number of the citizens of Pennsylvania, then in Washington, and the greater part of the Pennsylvania delegation in Congress, on 'the glorious Eighth of January,' 1816, gave a dinner at McKeowin's Hotel to Commodore

Stephen Decatur and Captain Charles Stewart. Captain James Biddle arrived in town the evening before and honored the company with his presence. The company sat down to dinner at 5 o'clock and 'spent the evening with the purest harmony and good humor.' After the cloth was removed, many toasts were drunk, accompanied with highly patriotic songs and music by the Marine Band."

The same newspaper reported a dinner held at McKeowin's Indian Queen Hotel on July Fourth, 1816. It told that "a large party of gentlemen assembled to celebrate the glorious festival of the anniversary of American Independence. . . . Accompanied with songs and music from the Marine Band, and announced by repeated discharges of artillery, many toasts were drunk." An irreverent soul has suggested that this is the origin of "having a shot."

Similar affairs were noted in 1817, 1818 and 1819. Marine officers, Marine artillery and the Marine Band were always in attendance. In the 1820 celebration, 5 Marine officers were among those offering toasts. Their patriotic fervor drew favorable comment.

In his report of the Japanese expedition, Commodore Perry described an interesting exchange of courtesies which took place in 1853 when he visited the Lew Chew Islands. After calling on the Regent at Shui (The *Susquehanna* was anchored at Napha), the Commodore and his officers were tendered an exotic dinner. It appears that 24 courses were planned, but the visitors lasted only for 12. This actually was a good performance. Twelve courses customarily comprised the largest ceremonial dinner. During the course of the dinner the Commodore introduced to the Lew Chewans a new practice when he offered, in saki, a toast to the queen mother, the viceroy, and to friendship between the two countries. The hosts were delighted and the "entertainment proceeded and terminated with the best possible feeling on both sides."

After a sortie from Napha, the squadron returned and found a new Regent installed. A dinner was given aboard the *Susquehanna* and


three boatloads of local dignitaries attended. They were received by the Marine guard, the band played and they were shown over the ship.

Dinner in the Commodore's cabin must have been a colorful affair. The locals wore dark purple, yellow, or white robes and crimson caps. Their introduction to Western food, drink and cutlery was an outstanding success. It was noted that they showed "but a very sorry appreciation of the virtue of temperance." The band played on deck during dinner and afterward some of the more expert performers came down to play solos on the flageolet, hautboy, clarionet and cornet-a-piston. The visitors left under a 3-gun salute.

The uses of this custom as a social and professional lubricant are well established. In 1820, the USS *Cyane* joined with some British ships in efforts to suppress the West African slave trade. The material for an unhappy relationship was present, since *Cyane*, her name unchanged, had been British in the War of 1812. Amicable relations were established by many exchanges of on board dinners—always, in *Cyane's* case, to the music of the Marine Band.

Adm "Fighting Bob" Evans was a great admirer of these dinners. In his autobiography he speaks with great warmth of exchanges with the British at Hong Kong in 1867. An extract from his book *A Sailor's Log* shows just how much these affairs can do to establish and maintain good relations. Speaking of the British military stationed in Hong Kong, he said: "They were courteous, hospitable gentlemen, and we enjoyed their mess dinners wonderfully. On their part they always seemed willing to come to us and make a night of it whenever we were ready. On the 22d of February we gave the finest entertainment we had so far attempted, seating over 100 guests, most of them foreign officers. We broke up at 1:00 a.m. after a beautiful evening long to be remembered. One of our English Army guests jumped overboard and swam ashore, where I delivered his sword and cap to him the next day over a glass of brandy and soda."

On another occasion, in 1895, Evans describes a dinner given



***The history of the Naval Service is replete with examples of military dinners to serve as precedents for today***

aboard the USS *New York* for the Emperor of Germany and 10 of his admirals. The officers and men of the ship's company were massed on the superstructure and in the gangways to greet the visitors on arrival. Adm Evans made a welcoming speech in which he requested permission to name the ship's 12-oared cutter, champion of the US Navy, "Victoria Louisa," in honor of the Emperor's daughter. The Kaiser was delighted and gave permission, whereupon the crew gave 3 cheers for the princess and 3 and a tiger for the Emperor. It must have been a most successful evening. At one o'clock in the morning, the guest of honor visited the engine room and tested the efficiency of the water tight integrity alarm system.

Examples could be multiplied *ad infinitum*. The practice of playing "Officers's Mess Gear" with fife and drum through officer's country aboard ship persisted until fairly recent times. As late as 1936, some of the larger ships were still having formal dinners, with a set drill and with officers in evening dress. The practice is not new in the American Service—it has only fallen into disuse.

It would appear from the foregoing that even the most devoted reader of the world's greatest newspaper cannot doubt the solid American pedigree of this custom. The details are in a sense unimportant. In the British Services, a number of pleasant customs and practices have grown up. The methods of service, the tablesetting, the passing of wine, and the offering of toasts all vary from regiment to regiment. The only important thing is that the pattern in each instance has been set by the history and associations of the unit concerned. With some exceptions, the Royal Navy toasts the monarch while sitting. The overheads in Her Majesty's ships are no longer uncomfortably low, but this custom dates from a time when they were. And so it goes.

The United States Marine Corps, in its own way, is tradition minded. Within the history of our Corps there is a rich vein awaiting exploitation. It must be acknowledged that we have perhaps borrowed too freely—and unnecessarily—from oth-

ers in this instance. The business of standing with one foot on table and one on chair while drinking a toast is the property of some of the British regiments—particularly the kilted ones—but it has no real place in the Marine Corps. In British messes, one does not smoke until the royal toast is drunk. This is a mark of respect for the monarch, but it also maintains a clean and sensitive palate for good food and wine throughout the meal. If the quality of these items is good enough, the practice is sensible in any setting.

Up to now, no detailed description of a formal dinner in the American Service has been found by this writer, although it is well established that the practice was common. This may not be a complete debit. Good taste, local practice and unit history will form the particular drill in each instance. The *Marine Officer's Guide* contains a sort of non-sectarian routine for a guest night. The basic requirements for such a dinner are easily described. It should be a stag affair, conducted with proper deference to formality and custom. The officers attending should wear the best uniform available under the circumstances. Food, wine, tableware and service should be of the best quality available. Mess and unit trophies should be dis-

played. Music adds much. Toasts and other ceremonial acts serve to give the meal its particular character. After dinner entertainments—songs, music, games, tests of strength—take place as the will and temper of the gathering dictate.

Let us not worry about the details—they will come. The history of our Corps will provide. Wistfully, it must be conceded that the 1820 custom of firing off a cannon before each toast may no longer be practical—but it's a wonderful idea. No single detail is important, but the idea can serve us well.

Most guest night dinners include toasts to the head of the State. Good manners make an exchange necessary when officers of another country are present. No matter what else is offered, or when, the Corps has, ready for its use, a toast which in spirit and in history needs defer to none. In a recruiting poster dated 1 January 1776, we see these stirring words: "Take courage then, seize the fortune that awaits you, repair to the MARINE RENDEZVOUS, where in a FLOWING BOWL OF PUNCH, an three times three, you shall drink 'LONG LIVE THE UNITED STATES, AND SUCCESS TO THE MARINES'."

Who knows a better way to close?

USMC





✱ THE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE IS A Marine Corps concept looked upon with favor not only by American tacticians, but by foreign experts as well. Military theorists, seeking a basic unit more compact than the present division, and with organic air power, believe the answer lies in an organization similar to that which the Marine Corps has been testing at Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii: the 1st Marine Brigade, FMF.

New farsighted proposals appear monthly in the *GAZETTE*, many of which fit perfectly into the air-ground task force scheme. Here is an attempt to combine as many as possible of these ideas, plus a few of my own, into a proposed table of organization for a future air-ground task force, or Brigade.

The Brigade, as presently constituted, is made up of a reinforced infantry regiment and air group, coordinated by a general staff under a brigadier general. However, no matter how powerful or unique a force the Marine air group is, it is not a unit capable of gaining and holding ground by itself. It remains a supporting arm, albeit a fabulously powerful and effective one. Thus the new Brigade is not two tactical

units like the brigade of years past, but one unit, the infantry regiment with mighty reinforcements.

Why, then, the double command structure, with regimental S-staff and Brigade G-staff? The two commands and their staffs should be combined, commanded by a brigadier general and served by a G-staff. There should be a brigade headquarters, with 3 (or 4) infantry battalions as maneuver elements; and reinforcing elements consisting of an air group, an artillery battalion and a number of special-purpose companies combined into new battalions.

The commanding officer of the air group would be a colonel, and each section of the G-staff would be augmented by an air liaison officer until such time as the special requirements of Marine air are completely understood by all staff members. The commanding general of the Brigade would be an officer with both air and ground experience.

Supporting arms should be reapportioned and augmented in many areas. Let's activate some of these broad theories:

1) Pare all headquarters elements to the bone. Precede this by a searching reappraisal of administrative

procedures with a view to cutting out "administrative frills." The battalion weapons company in the plan would be small enough to be combined with the battalion Headquarters and Service Company (see *Firepower and Combat Formations* in the May '54 *GAZETTE*).

2) The fire team should be reduced to 3 men: rifleman—fire team leader; automatic rifleman; assistant automatic rifleman. There are 2 justifications for this; by adopting the FN rifle with its 30 per cent lighter ammunition, and the lighter field equipment now under test, it would be possible for 3 men to carry (and fire effectively) the number of rounds which now require 4 men. On the other hand, if the ammunition load cannot be increased, it will increase control and flexibility to have a 3-man fire team, making new units of the manpower available.

3) The smaller squad principle should also be applied to the machine gun platoon. For attack, adopt the Army's shoulder stock machine gun, keeping the tripod light machine guns and/or the heavy machine guns available as alternate equipment for defense situations (see *Magic Square* in the Oct '54 *GA-*

# REORGANIZE THE MARINE BRIGADE

By 1stLt H. P. McLoughlin

ZETTE). Under these conditions, a machine gun squad of 5 should be ample (see *More Firepower, Smaller Units*, in the Dec '54 GAZETTE).

4) Adopt the 37mm recoilless rifle, firing spigot ammunition, as an antitank weapon at company level. Nine squads of 3 men each would provide the flexibility and punch needed against an armor-strong enemy (see *Hoist the Regiment* in the May '55 GAZETTE, and *Firepower and Combat Formations* in the May '54 issue).

5) Drop the assault platoon from the battalion weapons company, but put an assault platoon in every rifle company. Again, use 9 squads of 3 men each, with dual roles as 3.5-inch rocket launcher teams and flame-thrower-satchel charge teams.

6) Atomic warfare will result in scattered, small-scale engagements. This will involve attachment of crew-served weapons to the lowest echelons, even if the gun section must be split in the process. For this triangular organization a 3-gun section will be needed so that no unit in this 360-degree warfare will be without support.

The result of the suggested new company weapons will be a larger company having slightly more officers and noncommissioned officers. Being strictly triangular at all levels, this company can be distributed so as not to overload any subordinate troop leader when the situation requires wide dispersal and consequent difficulty of control for the company commander. In other words, whether the non-rifle elements are in general support of the company, or attached to individual platoons, no leader will have to control more than the 5 to 7 subordinate leaders recommended as the ideal number by Liddell Hart. However, to free the company commander from as many details as possible, he should have, in addition to his executive officer, 2 officers (of warrant rank?) in company headquarters: an opera-

tions officer, combining on a company level the functions of battalion S2 and S3; and an administrative officer, joining the duties of the S1 and S4. The added men and officers would make the Marine company the numerical equivalent of a stripped-down European battalion. In striking power, it would far exceed most European battalions.

7) The atomic defense requirements of the future will necessitate splitting the Brigade into reinforced battalions at least part of the time. In such an event, Division and Force Troops will be too remote to provide supporting units. Therefore, these units should be assigned directly to the Brigade, to be readily available for possible further breakdown to serve scattered battalions. For example, the 155mm howitzer battalion should send a battery to the Brigade. The armored amphibian battalion, the antiaircraft artillery battalions and the Force Troops and Division tank battalions should likewise send company/battery-sized units to the integral parts of the Brigade. A rocket battery should also be assigned to the artillery battalion supporting the Brigade.

8) As has already been advocated, transfer the 4.2 mortar company to the artillery battalion. This would give the heavy mortars the communications, fire control and forward observer strength it needs, and eliminate the many extra administrative personnel needed to operate a separate company. In an integrated, compact organization like the Brigade envisioned here, the support of the 4.2 mortars will be as readily available to the rifle companies as at present, whether the 4.2s operate with the artillery or directly under the infantry commanding officer.

9) Turn over to the armored group, which should be part of the Brigade, the tank or "Ontos" platoon of the antitank company. Give each battalion weapons company a

platoon of recoilless 75s. Distribute the antitank company's bazookas and the remaining administrative personnel also, eliminating the company.

Strong antitank protection at all levels characterizes this T/O. One of the greatest dangers to a landing on a large land mass, is the threat of early counterattack by strong enemy armored reserves. If an assault unit penetrates the beach defenses, it may be caught between the advancing tanks and the reserve elements of the beach defense force. Tanks can be a pushover for men with the weapons available to today's Marines, provided the men are bold, determined and superlatively trained in antitank warfare; trained to the point of complete familiarity with tanks, their many blind spots and weaknesses. Historical studies show that both Germans and Russians discovered in WW II that large-scale tank attacks could be stopped—by plenty of proper weapons, properly used. The Brigade, then, can be expected to knock out armored thrusts even before its own tank forces are ashore (see *H-Hour—AT Guns, Not Tanks*, in the June '54 GAZETTE).

The tank strength of the Brigade, if augmented by division and Force Troops, would be sufficient to form 4 small fighting "companies," plus service vehicles, with one company thus available to support each infantry battalion. If an armored amphibian company from Force Troops were used as a mobile reserve as well as an adjunct to the artillery, the tanks would be free for use in direct support of rifle companies, or, once the beachhead was established, as an independent striking force.

The tank companies could use a 3-vehicle platoon, commanded by a second lieutenant. The present 5-vehicle platoon is not too large, but a greater number of small platoons would make a more flexible force, each unit of which would have a considerably reduced control prob-



lem. Furthermore, the strictly triangular arrangement is better suited to effective tank-infantry co-ordination, especially under conditions requiring very wide dispersal.

With 9 tanks to a tank company, commanded by a first lieutenant or captain, and 4 tank companies to a tank battalion, led by a major, a tank strength of over 40 vehicles would be available to each Brigade without materially increasing the number of tanks in the Marine Corps. To these should be added a 9-vehicle company of armored amphibians for waterborne tank attacks, and a 9-vehicle company of tank-mounted antiaircraft artillery to protect the armor from one of its most dangerous enemies. An "Ontos" platoon (present T/O) could be added here also. If necessary, "Ontos" squads could be attached to the battalion headquarters companies.

All equipment organic to the infantry battalions under this scheme is readily transportable by helicopter, including short and long-range direct fire weapons (which are also antitank weapons) and mortars.

Two additional battalions should be formed within the Brigade. One, a service battalion, would include the engineers, shore party group

company, and a service company of elements from Division and Force Troops, formed around the present service regiment detachment of Brigade.

The second new battalion would be a headquarters battalion, composed of a headquarters company; a motor transport company, combining a truck company with the motor transport sections of the present regimental and Brigade headquarters companies; a medical company, combining all the medical facilities available to the Brigade; and a signal company, combining communicators from division, regimental and the present Brigade headquarters companies.

The service battalion would need a small headquarters company and the headquarters battalion a battalion headquarters section in headquarters company. At first these elements would control administrative matters only. As the officers became more familiar with the problems the new groupings would present, battalion commanding officers and staffs in these battalions would assume more and more of the work required in fitting their units into the scheme of operations of the Brigade.

If enough helicopters were made

available to the Marine Corps, the functions of the motor transport company could be taken over by the air group; true, helicopters are not trucks, but then, neither are fixed-wing aircraft, certain types of which serve very well for transport.

The organization resulting from these modifications would be a sort of vest-pocket division. "Marine Corps Brigade" would continue to be a proud and fitting name for it. In landings, instead of attaching appropriate supporting elements to a division or divisions, an appropriate number of Brigades could be assigned to an amphibious corps commander. Nine such Brigades, loosely organized into 3 "Marine Amphibious Corps" having small administrative echelons but no combat elements, would include about the same number of Marines as are at present in the Fleet Marine Force; but they would be organized in a manner better suited to conditions of present-day warfare. A peacetime saving of 9,000 men could be effected, without sacrificing combat readiness or detracting from realism in training, by having the peacetime table of organization include 3 infantry battalions instead of 4 in each Brigade.

USMC

Fire team: 3 men  
Squad: 10  
Platoon: 35  
Company: 254  
3 rifle platoons (105)  
1 60mm mortar section (20)  
1 light machine gun platoon (53)  
3 sections of  
3 squads of  
5 men each  
1 assault platoon (32)  
3 sections of  
3 squads of  
3 men each  
1 rocket gunner/flame thrower operator  
1 assistant gunner/operator  
1 ammunition carrier/demolitions man  
1 37mm recoilless rifle platoon (32)  
3 sections of  
3 squads of  
3 men each  
1 headquarters section (12)  
commanding officer; executive officer; operations officer; administrative officer; first sergeant; gunnery sergeant; property non-commissioned officer; armorer; clerk typist; 3 radio operators  
Battalion Headquarters Company (280 approximately)  
1 headquarters platoon (100 approximately)  
1 81mm mortar platoon (81)  
1 75mm recoilless rifle platoon (89)  
3 sections of  
3 squads of  
9 men each  
Full infantry battalion (3 rifle companies, 1 headquarters company): approximately 1,042 men  
Four infantry battalions: approximately 4,168 men

Tank Battalion (360)  
4 tank companies of 30 men each  
1 armored amphibian company of 50  
1 antiaircraft artillery company of 50  
1 headquarters company of 40  
1 service company of 100  
Artillery Battalion (1,000 approximately)  
4 howitzer batteries of 105 men each  
1 4.2 mortar battery of 130  
1 4.5 rocket battery of 60  
1 antiaircraft artillery battery of 105  
1 headquarters battery of 160  
1 service battery of 120  
Headquarters Battalion (1,300 approximately)  
1 headquarters company of 400  
1 medical company of 400  
1 signal company of 250  
1 motor transport company of 250  
Service Battalion (1,100 approximately)  
1 headquarters company of 80  
1 service company of 300  
1 engineer company of 500  
1 shore party group company of 220  
Marine Air Group (1,500 approximately)  
Total Brigade: approximately 9,450 men



# march 27th at NIKOLAYEV

By LtCol W. F. Frank

BY THE EARLY SPRING OF 1944 the tide of battle in the Ukraine was mounting against the German forces. The Soviet pressure slowly forced the Germans backward toward the Bug River and the important base at Nikolayev. Here were the shipyards which repaired German naval and supply ships. A breakthrough of the German defenses and the capture of the port would produce a major salient in the German lines.

The Soviet staff estimated that an assault landing in the rear of the German forces would draw off some of the German defenders and sow confusion in the German rear.

The date of the attack was to be at dawn on 27 March 1944. The spring thaw had commenced along the southern reaches of the Bug River and the early spring rain was heavy and lashed by the wind. The flooding Bug was overflowing its banks. Adding to this were the strong waves whipped up by the wind. On such a night, March 26, was the loading out begun.

At the small village of Bogoyavlensk on the South Branch of the Bug, 7 old fishing boats had been assembled. Ammunition boxes, supplies and first aid kits were loaded. Then the antitank guns and machine guns were placed aboard. When all was ready, the troops with submachine guns and boxes of grenades quickly took their places. Noiselessly the boats pulled off and disappeared into the dark stormy night toward the objective, 15 kilometers away.

This assault force was small, numbering perhaps 70. However, it was an elite force chosen from the hundreds of volunteers. Fifty noncommissioned officers and sailors from the Soviet Naval Infantry provided the core of the force. Twelve combat engineers had been added and the force had 5 officers. Its commander was Senior Lieutenant Olshanski. Formerly a naval officer, Olshanski had finally gotten himself transferred to the Naval Infantry and had participated in several

assault landings, including one almost identical in purpose to that upon which he was now embarked.

This force had a mission which would have been difficult under normal conditions. It was to effect an assault behind enemy lines, landing on the high ground at the entrance to the port and holding it. To do so, Olshanski was required to move his force without detection along a river whose banks were held by the Germans. Once the landing was made the objective was to be held at all costs.

The force in its 7 old, leaky boats slowly made its way across the river. The wind became stronger. The waves broke over the boats. Those who were not rowing continually bailed with their helmets. More than once it seemed that this boat and then that one would go to the bottom. Bailing and rowing, the force continued and shortly before dawn the boats reached the entrance to the port.

Scouts slipped ashore and noiselessly overpowered the German outpost. The engineers traced a path through a minefield and the equipment and troops quickly moved into the 3 port buildings, the principal of which was of brick, and converted them into strong points. With the coming of dawn the battle for Nikolayev began on all fronts and against Olshanski's position.

Apparently alarmed about the outpost, the Germans sent a company to investigate. Olshanski permitted the troops to approach until they could be ambushed. The Germans then committed the remainder of the battalion, but the Soviet force could not be dislodged. Knowing not the size of the defending unit, but only that it fought determinedly, the Germans attacked the position with 2 additional battalions supported by armor and artillery.

The Germans assaults followed one after the other but, though advances could be made, the Soviet position could not be taken. The fire of the German artillery and armor was accurate and flame throwers sent streams of fiery death through the windows. Yet Olshanski's force held on. The force fought from window to window, the wounded firing until they died or became unconscious. Over the radio the defenders called for artillery fire in certain areas. The port area was in shambles, fires and smoke sweeping back and forth. The attacks continued throughout the day and into the night, with the defenders slowly being thinned out. With the death of the last officer, Sergeant Second Grade Bochkovich took command, and the fighting continued amid the ruins.

At dawn on the 28th, the Soviet forces broke into the city and on past the port area. As the main attack swept on beyond the port, the remaining members of the landing force came out of the ruins, mission accomplished.

## EPILOGUE

The story of this assault is a translation from a Soviet account of the action. The fury of the action may seem exaggerated and incredible as to the ability of a small force to stand off successive, well supported attacks.

This minor assault at Nikolayev was typical of the manner in which the Soviets employed waterborne assaults to assist the principal effort by diversion. It emphasizes the fact that a small force properly organized, determined to attain its objective and resolutely led, can influence an action well out of proportion to its size. The intangibles such as determination, faith and skill can add more strength than mere numbers and weapons.

USMC





✱ SINCE THE ADVENT OF THE ATOMIC age considerable effort has been devoted to the development of new concepts of warfare designed to meet the challenge of nuclear weapons on future battlefields. If we are to hope for survival in this new era there is no doubt that rapid and thorough development of solutions to the problems posed by the destructive power of such weapons is of paramount importance to all of us.

Numerous discussions and possible solutions have been presented, with increased dispersion and mobility as the key factor in most cases. The general trend is towards mechanization in ever more astounding scope, with increased emphasis on rapid movement, wide dispersion of units, vertical envelopment, troops deploying into combat with a speed that would have seemed fantastic a few short years ago. In keeping with the emphasis on dispersion and mobility, the assault forces require elements that are capable of launching rapid, slashing attacks in the best "hard-charging" style. Undoubtedly this concept will continue to be the theme of further developments. "Gittin' thar fustest with the mostest" is still a good target to shoot for. Perhaps the only factor that has changed to any great extent is the means employed for "gittin' thar."

To give the assault elements the necessary mobility and capability for launching this "hard-charging" attack involves huge quantities of supplies of all types. And to keep the attack from fizzling out once it is launched it is mandatory that these supplies be kept moving to where they are needed. This in turn requires large numbers of vehicles and mechanized equipment because manpower alone can not possibly move the supplies required over the long distances involved in the new concept of ever wider dispersion.

Speaking of equipment in general, and engineer equipment in particular, I believe we can safely say that no expense is spared in providing the Marine Corps, as well as the other Services, with the best available equipment. Our equipment is as good as that of any military organization in the world, when it is first placed in the hands of the using organizations. Where the penny pinching comes in is in providing



# PENNY-WISE POUND-FOOLISH

**Mechanized equipment is here to stay. Its upkeep requires constant maintenance and trained personnel**

**By Capt Clyde Sloan**

for the upkeep and maintenance of the equipment once it has been placed in use. There is no reason to assume that this condition prevails only in relation to engineer equipment. However, I am more familiar with the current situation in that particular field than I am, for example, with motor transport, so the comments and suggestions to follow are primarily concerned with engineer equipment.

In TM 5-505, *Maintenance of Engineer Equipment*, the blunt statement is made that maintenance of engineer equipment during WW II was inadequate both in quantity and quality. It is true that this is an Army manual and most of the information therein pertains to Army equipment. But based on my own observation there is no reason to believe that the above statement is not equally applicable to our Marine Corps engineer equipment maintenance during that same period. Nor do I see any reason to believe that there has been any great improvement in the situation. Over the years

the complexity and quantity of motorized equipment has been constantly increasing, and the concepts and tactics of warfare have accordingly been revised and modernized to keep pace with this progress in mechanization.

But progress seems unable to proceed beyond the point of initially supplying us with the needed equipment. When it comes to maintenance of equipment we are still creaking along in the antiquated and outmoded days of the condiment can and the heavy marching order. Go to the "nuts and bolts" level of the people that have to do the actual repair work when equipment breaks down, and you will find the same story over and over again. Most equipment breakdowns are the result of carelessness or ignorance on the part of the operator, poor preventive maintenance or in some cases no preventive maintenance at all. I believe we can safely proceed on the assumption that deficiencies in the operation and maintenance of motorized equipment do exist, so let

us consider possible ways and means of eliminating some of them.

First, we must place more emphasis upon actual on-the-job training of equipment operators and mechanics. Of course, we already have on-the-job training, and we have schools for operators and mechanics. But we are only scratching the surface. On-the-job training for equipment operators and mechanics as currently conducted is desultory in most organizations, to say the least. Somehow the training schedule seems to continually require attendance of all available personnel at one formal training period after another, while incompleting repair jobs continue to accumulate in the shops, and preventive maintenance on other equipment is postponed day after day.

Certainly it has been realized down through the known history of training men to be soldiers that it takes more than a few weeks of recruit training to produce a first-class fighting man. For troops to achieve and maintain proficiency with their weapons takes continued training and schooling, and actual application of what they have learned, day after day, week after week, the year around. This type of training is provided for machine gunners, mortar men, BAR men, artillerymen and so on down the line for every type of weapon there is. Certainly there is no reason to believe that it takes any lesser amount of training to produce, say, bulldozer operators, or road grader operators, who will know enough about their jobs to hold up their end when the chips are down. The idea seems to have taken root that while a machine gunner or a rifleman requires constant and intensive training the year around, once a tractor operator or crane operator has graduated from the engineer school he has learned all he needs to know about operation of his equipment, and he can spend the rest of his time being lectured on subjects ranging from ABC defense to world affairs.

The hard reality of the situation is that most of the students upon graduation from the engineer school are at about the same stage of their development as equipment operators as a baby who has just taken his first step is in learning to walk. It would

be equally logical to assume that a man is an expert rifleman because he has just been taught how to load his rifle.

Of course, we cannot eliminate all training except that which pertains to an individual's primary MOS. General military subjects must be included in any training schedule, in order to enable the men to pass their GMST for promotion, if for no other reason. But what actually happens is that so much time is taken up by all these other subjects, that there is not enough time left for adequate training in what, after all, is supposed to be the primary MOS for equipment operators and mechanics.

New concepts in the conduct of warfare to keep pace with progress in weapons and equipment are an accepted fact. Is it not time, then, to adopt equally new concepts in training personnel to operate and maintain some of this equipment? Certainly the present concept of training is far from satisfactory. We are producing jacks-of-all-trades who know a little about a lot of subjects, but they do not know enough about any one subject to be worth while. So why not set up a training schedule providing for specialists such as equipment operators and mechanics to receive training in nothing but general military subjects for, say, 2 months out of the year? During this period annual requalification firing could be included, firing of crew served weapons, gas chamber training, swimming qualification, close order drill and so forth, followed by annual leave for those entitled to and desiring same. A schedule of this type could be established for a quota of personnel from different units to attend annual refresher training in military subjects for 2 months each year. Upon completion of this class, personnel would then be available for relatively uninterrupted training in their primary MOS for the rest of the year, or until they become due for their next annual refresher course. Organized training could then be conducted for equipment operators and mechanics, without having them constantly dribbled away to attend lectures and training periods on military subjects within the organization. I also believe that an intensive annual refresher course would accomplish more towards

achievement of the traditional objective, every man a Marine first and a specialist second, than the present method of 30 minutes here and an hour there, haphazardly presented by instructors who in many cases do not know their subject as well as some of the students do.

The operators and mechanics that we do manage to train are of little value to the Marine Corps if they continue to leave it as soon as their enlistments expire. By the time they have accumulated enough experience to be of some value, they are gone, and we are constantly replacing comparatively experienced men with green beginners. Dissatisfaction with the lack of opportunity to work at their trade is one of the main reasons these men are not reenlisting. Every day you can hear the gripes. "I thought I came here to learn to be a tractor operator, but I spend more time 'trooping and stomping' than I do on a tractor." After all, most men who have an equipment operator's or a mechanic's MOS received that MOS as a direct result of an indicated aptitude for, or an interest in this particular field. Especially in the case of personnel who have attended a school in their specialty it is only natural that upon being assigned to a unit for duty they would prefer to continue working primarily in their chosen field. When it becomes apparent that there will be little, if any, opportunity to work in their primary MOS it is no wonder that they become discouraged and lose interest. We cannot afford to continue this penny wise and pound foolish approach of spending millions for equipment, more thousands for schooling personnel to operate and maintain it, only to nullify the whole effort by continued adherence to a training program geared to the days of the Springfield rifle.

We might as well face the fact that mechanized equipment is here to stay. Unlike a rifle or a machine gun it can not be oiled and put on a shelf until we want to use it. It requires constant maintenance by personnel who are adequately trained for the job, so why not bring the training schedules up to date and provide for a new concept in training to go with the new era in weapons?

USMC



# A COMPARISON . . .

## OLD & NEW JAPANESE DEFENSE FORCES

By Yoshitaka Horie

### Preface

● I WAS A JAPANESE OFFICER FOR many years but since the end of WWII, I have been working in the American Forces. I thought a comparison between the American Forces and the Japanese Forces might be interesting to your readers.

Frankly speaking, the American Forces are armed forces of a rich and modern country and the old Japanese Forces were those of a poor and ancient country. The former had grown up under democratic circumstances and the latter grew up under the feudal system. From the standpoint of location, the former belongs to the American continent and European circle and the latter belonged to Asia. Therefore, it can be said that the differences between the American Forces and the Japanese Forces was a natural and logical one.

On the other hand, however, the new Self-Defense Forces of Japan is different from the old Japanese Forces, and also from the American Forces.

### Old Armed Forces of Japan

#### General Situation

The Imperial Japanese Armed Forces were established at the beginning of the era of the Emperor

Meiji. It was 1872; that is, 85 years ago. At this time, the uniforms, systems, weapons, equipment, tactics etc. were patterned after European armed forces. However, there was no fundamental change in the traditional idea which had grown up in the ancient Japanese soldiers. This old idea was rather widespread in the Japanese Armed Forces as a result of Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese officers impressed by their victory came to believe that the victory was gained by Japanese power alone, having forgotten the world opinion at the time and particularly the aid received from other countries. These officers created their own style educational organizations and insisted on their own ideas. These ideas were, indeed, old, narrow-minded and feudalistic. As the result of them, there were many strong and weak points in the Japanese Armed Forces.

**Strong Points.** (These might be considered weak points by Western militarists.)

a) Most of the officers and men thought more of their country than private affairs.

b) They simply obeyed the orders

of their superiors and did not have time to judge and criticize the orders.

c) They were diligent in their duties and felt responsibility to a high degree.

d) They withstood the poor meals, poor clothes and poor entertainments with patience and perseverance. They were willing to walk 25 miles a day.

e) They did not speak about their private business. They thought and spoke of loyalty to their mother country.

f) They did not fear death. They were indeed glad to devote their souls and bodies to their country.

**Weak Points.** (These might be considered strong points by Western militarists.)

a) Overestimation of spirit and underestimation of materials. They thought much of spiritual value and finally came to think light of materials. For instance, they would boldly fight with bamboo spears against the enemy's tanks.

b) They always envisioned tactical plans intended to defeat an enemy of larger number with their smaller number. In order to do this, they valued "surprise attack." That



With the position Japan is assuming in the Free World, the status of the Japanese defense establishment is of increasing importance



**NEW**



Wide World

is, they always thought how to attack the enemy's flank or rear by a small number of infantry under the darkness or unusual terrain. Sometimes the Navy enlisted men tried to destroy the enemy's warship with their small gunboats in the night. I don't say that this was bad, but I would say that they overemphasized the use, and overrated the value of these methods and were apt to forget the co-operation of infantry, artillery and aircraft.

These ideas were fostered in the grammar schools and high schools by a story that some brave soldiers won victory over a great number of enemy by their surprise attack from the top of some steep-sloped mountain at midnight about 700 years ago.

c) Bad trend making light of "Defense and Retreat" tactics.

All cadets or students in the Army and Navy were instructed how the offensive was good and the defensive was bad. In those days they were given hundreds of textbooks in which a few lines were being written about the "Defense and Retreat" tactics. "Defense and Retreat" of the Japanese Forces would happen very rarely, it was written, and it

would be planned only for the support of some other front or for the preparation of the future offensive. This idea was very good—I still believe it. However, instructors did not try to teach the students about the defense and retreat, and if some students made a plan of "Defense and Retreat" in their work-sheet in the tactical school hours, they were called cowardly and were insulted by the instructors.

The above-mentioned manner of thinking came from a story in an ancient civil war in Japan. This story was one of a commander who went to sea for a battle in the Inland Sea. He prohibited any effort on his ship to retreat, refusing his Chief of Staff's advice, saying, "My way is only one—advance or death." He won victory over the enemy and he was admired by the Japanese people.

In 1944 and 1945 I had trouble in the defense plan of Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima because of the lack of ideas and training on defense. It is indeed a fact that the late Gen Kuriyashiki and I took 6 months to convince the officers. They did not want to listen to our reasons for defense, they just simply wanted a counter-attack.

d) Wrong propaganda making light of the enemy.

Most of Japanese officers emphasized how the Imperial Japanese Forces were the No. 1 armed forces in the world and had never been defeated. This was very good. However, this emphatic propaganda led most soldiers to overestimate their own armed forces, particularly, to believe unconsciously the divinity of the Emperor. Finally such an idea made light of the enemy. That is, they became blind in a just comparison of themselves to their enemies.

e) Making light of foreign language.

About 400 years ago, Gen Toyotomi, a famous hero in the Japanese history, led an expedition to Korea to conquer the Korean Empire. One staff officer tried to take some interpreters from Japan to Korea. At this time, Gen Toyotomi said, "We don't need interpreters. Let Korean people use Japanese language."

This story was very popular in the high school text books and Gen Toyotomi's attitude was admired by the young students. This childish idea grew up in the Japanese Armed Forces, particularly in the Army, and to my great surprise, the Govern-





**Mr. Horie** has written for the Gazette on several occasions in the past. His familiarity with the problems discussed here stems from his own experiences as an officer in the Imperial Japanese Army and his post war association with the men who were creating the present Japanese self-defense forces. Being graduated from the Imperial Military Academy in 1936, he fought in China for two years before he was hospitalized by wounds. Finishing the War College in 1942, he had staff appointments which included responsibility for the movement of shipping; liaison officer with the Navy; and in charge of supply for the Pacific islands. Later he became defense planning officer for Iwo Jima, and after its fall, Chief of Staff of the 109th Div. After the war he worked for the US Air Force and later went into business for himself.

ment prohibited teaching of foreign languages in the schools during WWII, declaring that the study of foreign languages would lead the youth to weakness.

I was again surprised when I learned that the United States started emphasizing the study of the Japanese language when Japan stopped the study of English.

#### f) Making light of science.

Science and scientists were unlucky. The laboratories of the scientists were poorly equipped, the budget for research and experiment was small and their treatment was not good.

I don't know the exact reason why the Japanese Armed Forces did not think much of the science and scientists, but I imagine it came from the general idea which underestimated the value of materials.

#### g) Ignorance of the treatment of prisoners of war.

Most of the Japanese officers and men did not pay attention to the treatment of the prisoners of war.

This trend came from the following reasons:

Japan did not permit Japanese officers and men to be taken as prisoners of war in any case. They could choose only death in their hopeless cases. So, if someone became a prisoner of war even in an unavoidable case, he was to be treated as a coward and was to be ignored as an individual. This tradition led them to ignore their enemy's plight.

Fundamentally Japanese people were not trained in civilization, culture and human ways. They tended to commit cruelties against the weaker peoples.

There was a misunderstanding in the Japanese people that the act of

killing a man with a sword was to be admired as heroism. This was indeed an ancient but bad custom.

#### h) Wrong tradition of the Army. Infantry was Boss in the Army.

At the beginning of the establishment of the Army it was true that the main strength of the Army was infantry. Then, the infantry officers were assigned to the important positions. Particularly, most of the positions of the War Department and the General Staff were gained by the infantry officers. The tactics at the Military Academy, and even at the War College, were designed to making infantry the main power. Fighting spirit and combat training of the infantry were emphasized very much and it was true that the result was good. On the other hand, however, it unconsciously happened that the other arms were neglected. Especially, the ideas of the engineer and artillery officers were not paid much respect.

Too many princes and peers were cavalry officers.

I don't know why so many princes and peers entered the cavalry, but it was true that theirs was a very powerful existence in the Army because of their birth. About 25 years ago, the War Department tried to replace the horses of the cavalry troops to armored cars. At this time MajGen Yoshihashi, Chief of the Cavalry Bureau in the Army Education Department, committed suicide, leaving his will that stated, "Removal of the horses from the cavalry troops is against a long-year tradition of the Japanese cavalry and I am very sorry to lose horses now for the sake of many prince and peer officers who love horses." By his suicide, the removal of the horses from the cavalry troops was stopped.

It was natural that this case prevented the employment of the armored cars by the Japanese cavalry, and it was the invasion by the German armored corps in Poland in 1939 that led most of the Japanese Army high-ranking officers to realize the need of the armored cars in preference to horses.

Adherence to some traditions or prejudices against some modern ideas by these princes and peers were major obstacles for the Japanese Army.

#### Making light of technical experts.

I have already written about science. The technical experts, likewise, were not treated well, particularly in the Japanese Army. Good university or college graduates preferred the Navy to the Army, so it was true that the Army did not have so many good technical experts.

Most of the honored graduates (given a sword by the Emperor) of the War College were sent to Germany for study. These officers were very influential. The War College studied the German war histories of WWI and WWII. I had to wonder why the Japanese War College studied the defeated side and why it did not study the war histories of the Allied Powers. The reasons were apparent. The first reason was because of the lack of prominence of the officers who came back to Japan from the United States and Britain as compared to the officers who came back from Germany and France. The second reason was that the Allied Powers were superior to Germany in the political strategy rather than purely military tactics and strategy, so it was easier for the instructors to pick up the tactical and strategical doctrines from the German side. The third reason was that there was some similarity in the national characteristic of Japan and Germany, and they liked the German tactics and strategies. The fourth reason was that there was a criticism that the Germans were superior in tactics and strategy, but lost WWI through political and economic reasons; therefore, the Japanese Army officers should study the German tactics. It was very regrettable that the Japanese War College did not study any about America or Britain.

#### i) Wrong tradition of Navy.

Gunnery officer was Boss in the Navy.

Most of the Naval Academy graduates used to be assigned to destroyers and sometimes to cruisers first. In the Meiji era there was no aircraft, so gunnery was most important on any ship. The gunnery officer's position became very outstanding and these officers later became ships' captains or members of the Naval Staff. These officers were just like infantry officers in the Army. They insisted on their opinion that big ships and big guns were essential factors to win victory in the Navy.

The traditional idea of big ships and big guns became a great obstacle in the modernization of the Japanese Navy. They stressed that the Command of the Combined Fleet, and also the flagship of every Fleet should be on a heavily armored battleship or heavy cruiser. It was very difficult to change their minds to establish a "Task Force" organization composed of aircraft carriers as its main power.

Making light of defense.

I wrote about prejudice of the gunnery officer graduates. However, it was true that some of the gunnery officer graduates were key figures in the promotion of the naval air power. The late Adm Yamamoto was No. 1 man from this viewpoint.

But all of the Navy officers were negligent in the defensive tactics at sea. Particularly, they did not pay attention to the convoy escort.

Big struggles between Naval Acad-

emy graduates and Naval Engineering Academy graduates.

The Naval Academy was located at Etajima, a small island in the Inland Sea, close to Hiroshima, while the Naval Engineering Academy was in Maizuru-city facing the Sea of Japan.

I believe the struggles between these groups probably influenced and prevented the progress of the Japanese Navy.

### New Self-Defense Forces of Japan

#### General Situation.

Right after the surrender of Japan, the old Japanese Armed Forces were completely disarmed, and the new constitution of Japan declared "No more war" and "No more arms."

Gen MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of Occupied Japan in those days, expressed a great admiration for this new constitution in his message to the Japanese people.

Any and all of the newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, cartoons, speeches, etc., charged the old Japanese militaristic policies with Japan's ills: "Who led Japan to a ruin?—the war mongers. Who made war-widows?—the war-mongers. Who brought the destruction of Tokyo?—the war-mongers. Who brought the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?—the war-mongers."

Very shortly after, all former Army and Navy officers and some other former high-level officials were expelled from government, business and educational fields. Their pen-

sions, likewise the compassionate allowance to the surviving families, were all shut out. At the same time, all plutocracies (millionaire group) were dismembered and their properties were frozen.

The poverty of the people became serious. Many generals and admirals sat in front of the train stations as shoeshine boys, colonels and commanders went around the back markets, shouldering their no-more used uniforms and boots and war-widows lived on the streets as prostitutes to earn their living. Land owners lost their lands by the Reformation of Land and some of them became beggars. On the other hand, tenants were very happy, gaining new lands.

The miserable situation of those days in Japan seemed to me more serious than that which occurred after the Civil War in the South of the United States of America of which I read and found many pitiful scenes.

One former officer said, "I had expected American denunciations against us, but I had not expected to be denounced by Japanese people so seriously. I still believe that I did my best for my mother country. However, I now hear such charges against the former military personnel from Japanese people that I will never want to join any armed force nor make my sons soldiers even if it should happen that Japan gets arms again in the future."


Most of the people were very busy earning their livings and they were no longer loyal or faithful to their country. In those days, one saying was, "Nobody but a fool would be an honest man."

At the end of 1949, the Japanese Government was ordered to establish a "National Police Reserve Force." I remember that 35,000 men were raised at that time, excluding former regular officers. The political situation in Asia was moving to a turning point in those days. There were very many critics of this force. But all except a small number who entered the Force were the men who were suffering from unemployment. So, people called it "Unemployed People's Pool," and they did not pay much attention to it.

It was the end of June 1950, and many American divisions were

### Old: fanatic dedication reinforced by severe discipline

Wide World





moved to Korea from Japan. All of us knew the reason why the Japanese National Police Forces was established at this time.

At this time the strength of the Police Reserve Forces was increased up to 75,000 men from 35,000. About 1,000 Army and 500 Navy former capable officers ranging in age from 32 to 45, in rank from major to colonel, received invitation letters to join the new Force.

My class had 416 men when we were graduated from the Military Academy. Of these, 260 were living at this time. About 50 men among 260 received such letters of invitation. We gathered in Tokyo and discussed what we should do. Other classes of the Military Academy and Naval Academy came to this conclusion:

"We do not know about the future of the Police Reserve Forces, but it will have a possibility to become bigger. Don't hesitate to apply for the Forces if any individual desires. It might be a good chance for those who have no regular job now."

In 1952, there was a second increase in the Force up to 95,000 men about 1,000 former officers were raised. At this time, I heard later, that many very capable former officers applied and the ratio of competition was 3 to 1.

In this year the name of the Forces was changed to "National Security Forces."

The name of the Security Forces was changed to "Self-Defense Forces" in 1954, and the strength of it is now

about 135,000 men including the newly established "Self-Defense Air Force."

#### Strong Points

a) It is a modernized armed force.

The organization, weapons, equipment, training, etc., have been lent or given by the US Government. Particularly, it has enough big weapons, ammunition and transportation.

b) The Commander-in-Chief is the Prime Minister.

It is under the command of the Prime Minister; that is, the military belongs to the political administration. Therefore, there is no danger of arbitrariness of the Forces like that which appeared in the old Japanese Armed Forces under the name of the Emperor.

c) It has "Highest Defense Council."

The Commander-in-Chief has the Highest Defense Council, consisting of Secretary of Defense, Finance Minister, International Trade and Industry Minister, Foreign Minister, Transportation and Post Minister and some other Ministers under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. This Council will be able to establish the highest policy of the Government and the Self-Defense Forces.

d) It has the Office of Joint Chief of Staffs.

The joint chief of staffs will be able to control the teamwork of the 3 Forces.

e) It has a co-operation system with the US Forces.

#### Weak Points

a) Members of the Forces are

lacking in fighting spirit.

Most of the members are unemployed persons who entered the Self-Defense Forces to earn their living. This is the biggest difference from the members of the old Japanese Armed Forces which consisted of ambitious volunteers.

b) They depend upon the US Forces too much.

Consciously or unconsciously, they are thinking that the key in case of an emergency will be in the hands of the US Forces. In other words, they are thinking that the defense of Japan will be decided by the US, although they say that Japan is an independent country. So, they do not feel responsible.

When the Seventh Fleet had begun the evacuation of the Nationalist Chinese troops and civilians from the Tachen Islands, I met one lieutenant colonel of the Ground Self-Defense Forces in a railway train, whom I knew when he was in the Imperial Navy. I asked him, "How does the Self-Defense Force feel about the atmosphere of the Formosan Area?" He replied, "Well, we, the kids of a kindergarten do not know about the PTA's problem."

We can pick up some idea of what the members of the Self-Defense Forces are thinking about the "difference of weight" between the Self-Defense Forces and the US Forces.

c) Most of the members are indulging in freedom and democracy.

They want nice clothing, good food and entertainment. They don't want hard discipline and training. They want to have it easy. They don't want to walk, but want transportation. They have become extravagant as if they are people of a rich country. They want their freedom and want to stay in laziness.

This is a far cry from the psychology of the old Japanese Armed Forces.

#### Conclusion

I believe that Japan is now in a transitory period, and I fervently hope that she will come to have an armed force bearing resemblance to the US Armed Forces in its psychology, morale, training and operation and still maintain her own standing in wealth, culture and nationality of Japan.

US @ MC

#### New: over-dependence on US Forces, methods and equipment

Wide World



# TROUBLE IN HELL FIRE VALLEY

By Lynn Montross



**A unit made up of assorted odds and ends pushed bravely on only to be trapped**

*OpOrder O-00 — Every truck driver a rifleman. Every cook and clerk a machine gunner. Forward into battle, my brave Headquarters troops, with the 1st Fumigation and Bath Platoon leading the bayonet charge!*

THIS ORDER, NEEDLESS TO SAY, IS imaginary. It merely envisions the ideal as glimpsed from afar by military organizations which hope that men with a non-combat MOS will not forget their infantry recruit training in the hour of need.

But what about the reality? How would these service troops conduct themselves if it ever came to a test?

The answer is that it did come to a test in Korea on a November evening in 1950. US Marine service troops put up an all-night battle against Chinese Communists who had them surrounded. And these cooks, clerks, military police and truck drivers gave such a good account of themselves as to do credit to their infantry recruit training.

This is the story of their courageous but losing fight in Hell Fire Valley. It is based not only on official records and narratives of survivors, but also the author's tape-recorded interviews of 5 Marine

NCOs, all of them service troops, who were participants.

The occasion was the great Chinese Communist counterstroke which hit X Corps in northwest Korea on the night of 27/28 November. During the past 48 hours the enemy had sent General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's "massive compression envelopment" into reverse after colliding with the advancing Eighth Army on the western side of the peninsula.

The major units of X Corps, commanded by MajGen Edward M. Almond, USA, were the US 3d and 7th Inf Divs, the 1st Mar Div, and I ROK Corps. When the blow fell, these troops were dispersed over a wildly mountainous area of some 10,000 square miles. The Marines, carrying out Corps orders to drive westward from Yudam-ni and relieve pressure on the Eighth Army, 80 miles away, found themselves hard-pressed by the attack of superior numbers in the sub-zero darkness. By the afternoon of the 28th, the enemy had fractionalized the Marine division into these 4 defensive perimeters having no physical contact with one another except by helicopter:

YUDAM-NI — 2 reinforced infantry

regiments supported by 3 battalions of artillery;

TOKTONG PASS — a reinforced infantry company;

HAGARU — a reinforced infantry battalion (less one company), 2 batteries of artillery, a provisional company of tanks and about 2,000 Army and Marine service troops;

KOTO-RI — a reinforced infantry regiment (less 2 battalions), 2 batteries of artillery and about 800 Army and Marine service troops.

The remaining Marine infantry battalion had been left behind at Chinhung-ni to guard the MSR where it dips from the mountains into the comparatively level stretch of 35 miles leading to Hamhung.

The Chinese attack caught the Marines in the process of displacing the Division CP from Hungnam to Hagaru. Three truck convoys of Headquarters troops had got through safely, but the last contingent reached Koto-ri on the 28th to learn that the enemy had set up road blocks along the 11-mile route to Hagaru. After the service troops were turned back by enemy fire, an infantry company from Koto-ri made an unsuccessful effort to clear the road.



This reverse seemed unimportant when 3 infantry outfits rolled into Koto-ri that afternoon, bound for the Hagaru area. The 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines, commanded by LtCol D. B. Drysdale, numbered 235 picked men, trained especially for raids and demolitions, who had been assigned to the operational control of the 1st MarDiv. Company G of the 1st Marines, including 205 men, had been on detached duty and was on the way to rejoin its own battalion at Hagaru. Company B of the 31st Infantry, USA, with 190 men, had been ordered to report to the Army task force east of the Chosin Reservoir, made up of 3 battalions from the 7th Inf Div.

These 630 infantrymen were organized into a task force under the command of LtCol Drysdale with a mission of opening up the route to Hagaru. The column moved out from Koto-ri at 0930 on 29 November, followed by the vehicles of the Marine service troops and supported by artillery fires from Koto-ri.

Task Force Drysdale made good progress until reaching the high ground about a mile and a half north of the village. Entrenched Chinese being encountered here, 2 infantry companies were committed to an attack which cleared the ridge. At 1130, however, LtCol Drysdale decided to postpone further action

when he learned that the 12 Marine tanks of D Co, 1st Tk Bn (less 2d Platoon) and the 5 tanks of the tank platoon, AT Company, 5th Marines, would be available to him at 1300.

Only within the last few days had the narrow, winding mountain road been made safe for tanks and heavy vehicles. A provisional Marine tank company had pushed through to Hagaru, and D and B Companies (each minus a platoon) of the 1st Tk Bn were due in Koto-ri on the 29th, with Hagaru as their destination. The first group of 17 tanks made contact promptly with Task Force Drysdale, and the attack was resumed at 1330. Following the armor came the Marine infantry company, the Commandos and the Army infantry company in that order, with the trucks and trailers of the Marine service troops bringing up the rear.

Task Force Drysdale also had the assurance that it would be strengthened by the 2 platoons of B Company tanks—just then climbing "over the hump" from Chinhung-ni—after they arrived at Koto-ri and refueled. These 12 machines and their 23 vehicles had orders to catch up with the convoy as soon as possible and form the rearguard. The column as a whole would then comprise 922 troops, 29 tanks and 141 vehicles.


Minor breakdowns delayed the

rearguard tanks, however, and they had not even reached Koto-ri as the main body fought its way a third of the distance to Hagaru. The task force advanced less than 2 miles during the first 2 hours in spite of good artillery and air support. The Chinese tenaciously defended every road block with automatic weapons, satchel charges, antitank guns and bazookas—these weapons of American manufacture having been captured from the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War. At frequent intervals the column ground to a halt while the infantry scrambled out of vehicles for counterattacks and the tanks shot it out with the enemy or maneuvered around craters.

At 1615 the task force had covered about 4 miles when it was stopped in Hell Fire Valley. This name was applied by LtCol Drysdale, who had seen many a hard-fought action. Here the enemy had entrenched in the high ground overlooking an S-curve in the road bordering the Changjin River. Chinese mortar and small arms fire pinned down the infantry elements of the column and knocked out one of the tanks. Less than an hour of daylight remained when the tank officers reported to Drysdale that further movement was not advisable on account of road conditions as well as stiffening enemy resistance. The British officer requested a command decision from MajGen Oliver P. Smith, commanding the 1st MarDiv, who had just arrived at his new CP. Without hesitation he directed that the attack continue.

It was a painful decision for the Marine general. But the thinly defended Hagaru perimeter had been attacked the night before by Chinese in estimated strength of 3 regiments, and another effort could be expected. Infantry and tank reinforcements were so urgently needed at Hagaru as to justify the risks.

During the halt the vehicles had been pulled off the road into a dry stream bed. Unit integrity was lost when they resumed the advance. Adding to the confusion, a CCF mortar shell set fire to a truck, thus creating a road block which cut the convoy in two. The tanks, the Marine infantry and most of the Commando unit fought on toward Ha-




garu in accordance with their orders. Left behind in Hell Fire Valley with their vehicles were about 300 men of Army and Marine units and the Commando.

The stranded troops piled out of the trucks and took cover in roadside ditches as dusk shaded into darkness. They had reason to hope that the B Company tanks would soon come to their rescue, but this prospect failed to materialize. In the first place, the 2 platoons of M 26s did not reach Koto-ri until 1600. After they refueled and pressed on toward Hagaru, enemy fire slowed up the advance as Chinese reserves closed in again on the road supposedly opened up by the main body of the task force. So stubborn was this opposition that the rearguard tanks were 2 hours at fighting their way less than 4 miles. About half a mile south of Hell Fire Valley, the road was blocked by crippled and destroyed vehicles, and at 1830 the tank officers decided to return to Koto-ri.

The 3d Platoon and half of the wheeled supply vehicles managed to turn around and start back. But a concentration of enemy fire cut off the 1st Platoon and its vehicles, making it necessary to halt about a mile south of Hell Fire Valley and form a tight perimeter. There was no cause for anxiety after calling for artillery fires from Koto-ri. Several Chinese probing attacks were broken up by machine gun fire from the tanks, and enemy efforts in this quarter ceased altogether before midnight. At daybreak the little column was able to make its way back to Koto-ri without Communist interference.

The 3d Platoon had covered only a third of the distance when Chinese fractionalization tactics scored again by disabling the fourth M26 of the column. The first 3 moved on to Koto-ri, arriving at 2000; and after pushing the cripple off the road and overcoming enemy resistance at several points, the remaining tanks and vehicles of the platoon got back at 0230.

So much for the rearguard elements. As for the head of the task force, the D Company tanks and infantry units fought through to Hagaru at a grievous cost in casualties.



All had arrived with their wounded by 2000, and the weary troops were immediately assigned to danger spots in the undermanned perimeter. This timely reinforcement was one of the chief factors enabling the outweighed defenders to beat off enemy attacks the following night.

Thus, by a process of elimination, it came about that a miscellaneous assortment of Army infantry, British Commandos and Marine service troops was left behind in Hell Fire Valley to fight all night for survival. Inadvertently, by drawing destruction to themselves, these unfortunates had contributed to the escape of the men who reached Hagaru and Koto-ri. It does not appear, however, that the doomed troops had any inkling at first of the seriousness of their situation. The halt in Hell Fire Valley caused no alarm, for the

convoy had been stopped at intervals all afternoon by enemy action. Marine air and artillery were still giving good support during the last minutes of fading daylight, and it was generally supposed that the march would be soon resumed.

Most of the service troops were having their first experience of Marine close air support. "It was so close," recalled TSgt. C. L. Harrison of the Marine military police, "that it gave me quite a scare. The planes would come in low. I'd say that some of their tracers hit within 50 to 75 yards of us. But after the first few passes, it was very evident that they knew what they were doing. And it was very effective."

Even when darkness put an end to air and artillery support, the troops did not yet realize that the middle of the column was isolated





and cut off from radio communication. The enemy had been driven back to a respectful distance by Marine air, and only scattered Chinese small-arms fire was received at the outset. In the flickering light from a burning truck up in front, the stranded troops got an impression of Hell Fire Valley that would haunt their memory the rest of their lives. There were ditches on either side of the road. On the right, just beyond an unused railroad track and a third ditch, the ground rose sharply to the hills held by the Chinese. On the left, between the road and the frozen Changjin River, a native house and several rice paddies were the only noteworthy features of a bleak, snow-crust plain. Altogether, it would have been hard to find a position offering fewer advantages to the defense. For the shallow ditches provided poor cover, being exposed to plunging fire from the high ground on the right of the road.

A second fracture in the stranded convoy occurred while LtCol Chidester and Maj Egan were trying to organize a return to Koto-ri. Their efforts were interrupted by a CCF attack which severed the column. Both Marine officers were captured and died of wounds shortly afterwards.

As nearly as can be reconstructed from confused and contradictory accounts, the convoy now consisted of 2 large perimeters and 3 splinter groups, strung out from north to south over a distance of perhaps 1,200 yards. Included were 52 British Marines, about 190 men from the Army infantry company, and an estimated 150 Marine service troops.

"Some of the men were firing wildly and wasting ammunition," said a Marine postal clerk. "Others weren't firing at all. Nobody seemed to know what to do at first."

Fortunately, the enemy was slow to take advantage of the situation. Far from pressing the attack, the Chinese contented themselves with small arms fire at long range during the early part of the evening. Several hours passed, according to the recollection of a sergeant before the Communists set up a mortar on the high ground to the right of the road.

"Their mortar fire wasn't very effective," commented a Marine NCO from the Service Company of the 1st TkBn. "Only one truck was hit. The pattern seemed to be just any place in the area."

The crying need, of course, was for the establishment of some order and system. Maj J. N. McLaughlin rose to the occasion. A Marine staff officer, he gained the confidence of men who took cover in the ditch and deployed as he directed. Troops beyond the reach of his voice were organized for defense by a veteran Marine MP, Warrant Officer Lloyd V. Dirst. Cool and collected, he strode up and down the road, smoking his pipe as he barked out commands.

In the lack of ammunition for the 60mm mortars, one 75mm recoilless was the heaviest weapon of the perimeter. There were no automatic weapons at all to support service troops armed with rifles, carbines and grenades.

Thanks largely to the leadership of McLaughlin and Dirst, the northern group gradually formed itself into a tight defensive perimeter on both sides of the S-shaped curve in the road. This development came in the nick of time, for the Chinese were sending out patrols of 5 to 10 men to probe for weaknesses. Some of the Communists came close enough to throw grenades, and Harrison was slightly wounded in the foot by a fragment.

"Just then," he recalled, "the thought struck me that it might be

just my luck to be captured again in my very first engagement and sit out the whole war as a prisoner. I'd been on Wake in 1942, you see, and I had a hunch that history was going to repeat itself as far as I was concerned."

It did not take the military perception of a Napoleon to see that the enemy held the tactical trumps. There was nothing to prevent the Chinese from slipping around either flank, and before midnight they had a second mortar set up in the left rear of the perimeter, between the road and the river. The enemy's bad aim reduced the effectiveness of this piece, but the Army medics were kept busy at giving first aid. Lightly wounded men remained in the fight as long as they could fire a carbine, and serious cases had only such shelter as could be afforded by the frozen ditch.

Dirst seemed immune to bullets as he walked tirelessly up and down the firing line. "Be careful of your ammo!" he counselled. "Don't fire unless you're pretty sure of a target. If we can just stick it out till day-break, Marine air will chase these gooks back to their holes."

So urgent was the ammunition problem that 2 Marines had been given the mission of trying to get through to Koto-ri in a jeep. This desperate gamble had not paid off, for the men were captured by the Chinese within hearing distance of the perimeter.

As hour after hour passed, the extreme cold fought on the side of the enemy. Most of the Marines were armed with carbines which functioned uncertainly at sub-zero temperatures. Yet there was no shrinking or shirking. Moreover, the Marine service troops gave as good an account of themselves in this defensive action as the Army infantry and the specially trained British combat troops.

It is taking no credit away from the valiant defenders of the perimeter to point out that the Chinese did not at any time launch an all-out attack. They gave the impression of being so sure of their prey that they could afford to wait. Later events indicated that taking prisoners was their primary object, and looting the stalled trucks had more

attractions than a fight at close quarters. The Communists made sure of victory by infiltrating around both flanks to the rear of the perimeter, but they confined their efforts largely to harassing attacks with small arms and grenades. Meanwhile they paused at intervals and shouted invitations to surrender in pidgin English.

Dirst was doling out cartridges on the firing line when a Chinese mortar fragment stretched him out unconscious with a critical head wound. SSgt James B. Nash, himself slightly wounded, set out on his third rescue mission under fire that night. He dragged Dirst to the middle ditch, now occupied by a long row of seriously wounded men, but the valiant warrant officer's chances of survival appeared to be slight.

Harrison, Nash and Estess took charge at this end of the perimeter. In the lack of ammunition for the 60mm mortars, the largest weapon had been a 75mm recoilless which an Army crew fired valiantly until all were killed or wounded and the gun put out of action. Twice the men commanded by Maj McLaughlin drove the Chinese from their mortar positions, only to have them return. By 0200 no grenades were left, and rifle ammunition ran so low shortly before dawn that the Marine officer gave the order to fix bayonets.

It was characteristic of him that, after realizing the hopelessness of his situation, he called for the Chinese to surrender! This demand, he admitted later, made little impression. Through an interpreter the enemy allowed him a 10-minute truce which he prolonged in order to permit individuals to escape. Consulting each of his remaining 40 able bodied men, he found that

some had no ammunition at all and none had more than 8 rounds. McLaughlin finally came to terms for the sake of the wounded, and the Chinese agreed to his condition that they be evacuated.

During the time killed by his parley, about 100 men of the southern perimeter and the 3 splinter groups were enabled to escape. Maj Henry W. Seeley led a group of Headquarters Marines back to Koto-ri after killing several pursuing Chinese. On the way he was joined by several officers and about 20 Marines and Army infantrymen. Other Army and British Marine groups managed to hide out in the hills and eventually make their way back to Koto-ri.

Service troops had demonstrated under the most difficult circumstances that their infantry recruit training had not been forgotten. Some of them wasted ammunition by fast and nervous firing early in the evening, but little fault could have been found otherwise. This was also the experience at Hagaru, where service troops proved to be steady and reliable in defensive operations. On the attack they did not do as well, though there were notable exceptions.


The enemy did not molest the Hell Fire Valley prisoners, but their wants were callously neglected at the outset of a captivity which many would never survive. And while the Chinese did not keep their word as to the evacuation of the wounded, at least they did not interfere with the removal of the most critical cases to a Korean house between the road and the river. After the enemy withdrew to the hills for the day, an opportunity was found to evacuate these casualties to Koto-ri. Among them was WO Dirst, who survived only to die a year later from the effects of his wounds.

A postscript was written in the spring of 1951 by front-page headlines announcing the escape from an enemy prison stockade of 18 Marines and a soldier who had been captured in Hell Fire Valley. These men, including the 5 Marine NCOs who contributed to this article, added valuable information to our knowledge of the enemy after being interviewed by G2 officers in Tokyo.

An accurate breakdown of the Task Force Drysdale casualties is not possible even to this day. Of the 25 Marines missing in action from the Headquarters Battalion, only 8 got back at the end of the war.

As nearly as can be determined, the total losses of the task force, including the casualties of the troops who fought through to Hagaru and Koto-ri, were 162 missing and 159 killed and wounded—nearly 35 per cent of the whole. About 75 men were killed and wounded in the defense of the Hell Fire Valley perimeter. The final count of prisoners apparently included 44 Marines, 18 Commandos and about 100 Army infantrymen along with 72 vehicles.

Six days later, when the 1st Mar Div initiated its breakout from Hagaru to Koto-ri, a somber spectacle awaited in Hell Fire Valley. There the American and British dead still lay where they had fallen in the frozen snow, and a ghostly silence enveloped the long column of charred and looted trucks. But at least the heavy losses of Task Force Drysdale had not been in vain, considering the far-reaching results. For MajGen Smith estimated that a reinforcement consisting of a tank company and about 300 seasoned infantrymen had made "a significant contribution to the holding of Hagaru which was vital to the Division." USMC



### Home Stretch

☛ ABOUT 2 HOURS after taking off from Wake Island on the way to Japan in Nov '52 the 4-engined MATS transport developed engine trouble and one conked out. One of the crew went around the plane reassuring all hands that the plane could fly as well on 3 engines as it could on 4. Evidently he didn't sell everyone because several "pale faces" appeared among the passengers, so he went into the pilot's compartment and returned with the plane commander. The plane commander didn't get a chance to reassure the passengers as he was greeted with this remark from the the rear of the plane "What happened, Captain, one of your rubber bands break?"

TSgt R. J. Southall

*(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)*





## OBSERVATION POST

### BRIGADE vs DIVISION

☛ QUANTICO, VA. — For the past 16 years, the Corps has based most of its plans and operations on a division-size unit. For the look to the future for all types of Marine warfare, let us consider the pros of a brigade and the cons of a division.

One must set up a basis for comparison. For this, consider the following: first—size, control and atomic aspects; second—logistics and economy; and third—readiness and mobility.

#### *Size, control and atomic aspects:*

The present Marine division numbers over 20,000 troops and housekeepers, consisting of a triangular organization of: infantry regiments and supported by an artillery regiment plus 7 separate battalions.

A proposed brigade would consist of the following: 3 battalions, with each battalion of 4 rifle companies, a weapons, and an H&S company. Under the present concept of "combat base-mobile warfare," when once the companies have seized their objectives and the base is set up, the battalion must be prepared to protect itself. By having 4 rifle companies in the battalion the "combat team" will have 3 units to maneuver; a fourth rifle company to protect the base, which includes the Bn CP and attached units. This extra company also will be the reserve and patrolling force. Intensive patrolling is necessary in order to find, fix and destroy the enemy either by conventional or atomic weapons. Therefore, this extra unit will greatly add to the flexibility and fighting strength of the battalion. In addition to the 3 BLTs, the brigade will have these supporting companies: Headquarters, 4.2 Mortar, Antitank, Communications & Service, Light Motor Transport and Light Medical; making a total of 5,500 troops and fewer housekeepers.

Thus, at least 9 brigades can be put in the field in lieu of 3 divisions, saving considerably on personnel and equipment. The division controlled by one man, through his staff, leaves complete control to be desired, but in a brigade, one man with 5,500 troops under his command is ideal.

These 9 brigades can be organized into 3 amphibious corps, each with 3 brigades in addition to these supporting battalions: LVT, Tank, Heavy Artil-

lery, Missile, 4.5 Rocket, Service, Engineer, Motor Transport and Medical; add to this Helicopter Support, Communications and Recon Companies.

Modern atomic warfare doctrine calls for dispersal of small units over widely separated areas. The Marine helicopter gives us the ability to mass or disperse the troops as the situation requires in rapid fashion. But the division, under these conditions, is hard to control and support, and authority has to be delegated down to regiments and mainly to battalions. A brigade operating independently will facilitate control; since the size and support are reduced, commanders are closer to the troops, and extensive communications are reduced. Mass landings of adjacent regiments on one beach area is obsolete.

#### *Logistics and economy:*

A division normally operates on a 30-day supply schedule, requiring a tremendous amount of supplies (and equipment to move these supplies), to be sustained as a combat unit in battle. Many of these supplies must be stockpiled in the beach area and delivered to the various regiments. Massing of supplies and poor delivery to dispersed units *can* cost a battle. Design the brigade to operate on a 10-day supply schedule, then these units with their *own* supply facilities can deliver more rapidly what the troops need. Then if one brigade is knocked out, the complete battle is not lost, but if a division's supply dumps are destroyed, not one, but 3 units are out of battle.

What effect will a brigade have on economy? First, require fewer men (thus a smaller, more select Marine Corps). Second, require less logistical support giving a more desirable "combat-ready package unit." Third, it will give the United States more fighters for its money by eliminating many of the housekeepers.

#### *Readiness and mobility:*

A brigade will be ready to move on a very short notice to the Middle East, Korea, or Cuba as required by the UN. Because of its size and small logistical requirements, it can be moved by sea on fast *carrier-transport* units of CAs, APDs, CVs and CVHAs or by *complete* airlift as the situation requires. Our mission is *not* mass land warfare but the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, and for the conduct of such land

operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign, or as the President may designate.

In this world of today we have learned the hard way that we must have what is really known as, "a force in readiness," a unit ready for nuclear, conventional, or "small-type" warfare. Do we really have "minute men" readiness? We must continue to re-analyze our tables of organization to perfect a better, cheaper fighting organization and in doing this *be always ready for any assignment.*

Capt A. C. Smith, Jr.



### DON'T TELL IT TO THE MARINES

☛ CAMP LEJEUNE, NC. — "Prepare for inspection." The command rings out loud and clear around the world wherever Marines are stationed. Every man remembers well the moment the inspecting officer stepped before him . . . how he wondered if he would be able to do inspection arms in a single smooth movement . . . whether he would pass inspection . . . or if some detail had been overlooked during preparation.

Using the inspection as a means of demonstrating the military chain of command is a lost art worthy of considerable comment and action.

No inspection of troops can be effective unless the next junior in the chain of command is present. If a battalion commander is inspecting, the company commander must be present, and so on down to the squad.

As we—the inspecting NCO or officer—progress through the inspection, we normally do an acceptable job of checking a man from keel up and stem to stern, and checking the rifle from muzzle to butt. We must do an acceptable job judging by the number of comments we make—comments to the men in ranks.

We should not direct our comments to the men in ranks. All comments should be directed to the NCO or officer next subordinate to the inspector. All comments should be brief and to the point, and intoned in a most impersonal

voice at a rate which permits the subordinate to record, or have recorded, the words of commendation and condemnation.

No red-blooded private wants his battalion commander to deal directly with him—except on request—and I'm quite certain no buck sergeant wants the CO to speak to his squad except through the sergeant. In simple words, if an NCO or officer is responsible for certain men and equipment, then let him have the responsibility without the modifying influence of an inspector bypassing the chain of command. Let us hear no more, "When did you press your trousers last?" or "Why didn't you get a haircut?" Rather, let us hear, "Sergeant, your platoon looks very good with the exception of Joe Blow whose haircut did not pass inspection."

This is the conclusion of it all. Don't tell it to the Marines *in ranks*. Tell it to the next subordinate and ensure that he corrects the errors and passes along the compliments.

Maj W. J. Buss

## FITNESS REPORTS, II

♣ CAMP LEJEUNE, NC.—It may be possible now to achieve a synthesis of ideas on the vital subject of fitness reports, considering the various views recently expressed in the GAZETTE.

Some of the facts that appear agreed upon are: 1) The chief purpose of a fitness report must be to aid in the selection of the best qualified for promotion. A secondary value is to indicate to the individual his weaknesses and shortcomings. 2) Our present reports are not doing the job because of the tendency to overmark or grade-up the overwhelming majority of persons. 3) The administrative load is heavy upon grading seniors today, and 4) there appears to be differences in the type of report needed as higher rank and selection attrition progressively increase the amount of data necessary.

I submit a few points to consider and finally, a solution encompassing, if possible, the thoughts of the various writers on this topic. The reasons behind our skewed distribution seem threefold: First, the basis is the profound American desire to be liked and thought well of by others. When it becomes necessary to rate an individual and reveal to him any shortcoming he may possess, this attitude acts as a modifying factor to lessen the severity of judgment; briefly, to grade-up.

Secondly, there is an inhibitory administrative factor now present in our system. In the event of unsatisfactory marks being given, the individual rated has a right to make a statement. This can act as a form of blackmail, in ex-

treme cases, in which the individual might present in his defense shortcomings of his superior. In any case, it is an opportunity for higher headquarters to look (unfairly perhaps) at the commander as one with a little less leadership or skill than other commanders who seem to have no such problems.

Finally, a commander must, under the present system, calculate the effect of a fitness report upon an individual's further work in his command. A commander in an initial report may not give as high a rating as he feels is deserved for fear it would later be difficult to improve upon and, thus, the individual rated has less motivation to progress. Another result is that a commander may feel obliged to rate an individual higher than he deserves as a reward for a particularly good piece of work. Higher reports than are deserved are often given as a stimulus by some to encourage their subordinates to do better. Finally, many seniors feel now that they must rate high because others do or their commands will feel unfairly treated in comparison with other, more lenient outfits.

These various factors mentioned may not seem to many as presenting a picture of the entirely objective and scrupulous commander we feel is our average. What must be remembered, however, is that one person's appraisal of

another is a classically subjective action and that the previously listed considerations are usually unconsciously considered by the rater rather than deliberately weighted. To eliminate the ills of our system, it is proposed we adopt different methods. First, we will never have the objective report we seek if it is necessary to show it to the rated individual.

How about unfairness to an individual? The progress of a report up the chain of command is another way of protecting an individual from an unfair report because it is safe to assume that a reviewing officer will take an interest in individuals receiving extreme reports or commanders who incline too far in either direction in their usual report.

Next, a progress conference between the commander and his rated subordinate should be mandatory after each report has passed the supervisory level. In this, the CO without reference to the report should informally discuss the various aspects of the junior's performance and abilities.

Lastly, we should reduce the administrative load presently felt by those having the obligation of making many reports and also allow for the increased information necessary for the higher ranks with greater attrition. A system of graduated reports to accomplish this

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is suggested. Replace the present single form (for actually there is little difference between the form for a staff sergeant and a colonel today) with say 3 types, based upon the criterion of information needed.

Type I would be a simple IBM-type card with only the basic and most necessary information contained, such as: derogatory or commendatory actions during period, (paragraph 14) preference to serve with, (paragraph 18) general value to service, (paragraph 19) and a remarks section (section D). Enclosures should elaborate on other than routine entries. This form would be used for SNCO, WO, CWO and second lieutenant. The factors governing promotion of these ranks appear much different than for the higher grades. However, by this simplification, the work necessary to accomplish 2/3 of the reports of the entire rated-personnel of the Corps would be considerably reduced.

In Type II is placed first lieutenants, captains and majors, utilizing the present form with one change. As previously suggested, reduce the number of blocks in section 15 and 17 to the 3: unsatisfactory, satisfactory and outstanding, with an explanation required for either of the 3 extreme markings.

Type III, comprising all ranks above major, probably represents a small percent of all reports submitted but is the area in which the most information is necessary. For this group, a report requiring more detailed and broader coverage might be required. Space for concise, pointed essays, as recommended by several writers, could be feasible considering the lesser numbers in this group. As to instructions to the marker on the meaning of ratings, use of form, etc., I suggest printing them on the back or as a tear off portion of the form. Certifications of having read them seem unnecessary.

To the professional Marine, a fitness report is his weather gauge, report card and sales graph. To the Corps, it is a crop forecast, census and pruning tool. For both, it must be appropriate, helpful and as nearly objective as can be achieved.

Capt M. B. Reilly

## REFERENCE-POINT SYSTEM

✻ MB, YORKTOWN, VA. — There has long been a need for a better method of locating a point on the ground and then that same point on a map. Evidence of this is the large number of systems that have been introduced to supplement or replace the standard grid co-ordinate system. Most of these methods, however, contain inherent weak-

nesses of their own, or are dependent upon a specific situation. A system was recently devised in the 3d Bn, 9th Marines, that proved to be the answer to this problem.

Basically, here is how the reference-point system works. The system employs a grouping of easily identifiable spots called reference points. The points are numbered and any other point on the ground is located by using one of the selected reference points and the 2 basic compass directions from that point.



An explanation may be broken down into 5 parts: selection of points, numbering, orientation, instruction and dissemination.

1) For the selection of points, the primary requisite is that they must be well defined. Critical terrain features, road junctions, solitary clumps of trees and stream mouths are examples of excellent reference points.

At least one reference point must be visible from any point on the ground. Care must be exercised in the selection of these points to assure that the number is limited to those necessary. Of course, the system is flexible enough to allow the introduction of additional points during the course of action.

2) For clarity in transmission, only 2-digit numbers are used. As a security measure, no set pattern is used to number the points and they are deliberately numbered in any manner. As an additional security ruse, only numbers from 20 to 90 are employed. This allows the use of an additional factor to further confuse the enemy. (For example, on D+1, add 1 to all numbers, on D+2, subtract 2 from all numbers, and so forth.) For extended operations, it would be a simple matter to introduce a factor using the date, or the last digit of the date. (For example, on the 18th, add 2.) This will keep all numbers in the 2-digit range and will keep the arithmetic mental.

3) To locate any point on the ground simply give its real relationship to any reference point using the 4 basic compass directions and the distance from the point. Express distances in meters, using single numbers for hundreds, (200 meters would be 2; 50 meters is .5,

etc.). To locate a point, a transmission might sound like this: "RP 36 N 4 W 2" (400 meters north and 200 meters west of reference point 36). A further advantage is gained in that a small unit leader does not have to have a map to locate and communicate a position if he is familiar with the local reference points.

4) The instruction in the use of this system is facilitated because the principles employed are so basic. A simple mimeographed sheet and 10 minutes during a briefing are all that is needed to effectively disseminate an understanding of the method.

5) The most satisfactory method of distributing the location of these points is for the S2 section to mark the maps before distribution. Not all of the maps must be marked and it is even desirable to allow platoon leaders to mark their own since some familiarity of the location of the points is gained in this manner. A rough overlay is not satisfactory to properly spot the points.

The battalion S2 should be charged with the task of preparing the points, the counterintelligence factor, instruction and distribution. Adequate time and facilities are presently provided for in the planning phase and in the T/O.

Other uses of the system are varied. The reference points serve as excellent check points for patrols. Also, a patrol's route can be quickly directed or ascertained by simply giving a series of reference points. This leads to more positive control by the battalion commander. Artillery finds that the reference points serve as excellent registration points and since nearly all fire is adjusted anyhow, a reference point is many times all that is needed to commence firing a mission.

The reference-point system described above is unique because it ties in a definite close relationship between the ground and the map that is currently lacking. This relationship is especially important to small unit leaders. Orientation can be accomplished, defined and transmitted even without reference to a map.

The reference-point system increases the speed, clarity, accuracy and security of describing points on the ground and is free of the burdensome shackle system. Only a slight amount of additional instruction is necessary to enable the wide-spread use of this system and nothing new to the Marine is embodied in its principles.

1stLt A. F. Moore

ED: Systems employing these basic principles and variations have been used by various armies on numerous occasions: British and Germans in Africa, US armored divisions in WWII and 1st Mar Div in Korea.

# passing in review

## BOOKS OF INTEREST TO OUR READERS

### A War Journal . . .

THE LAST PARALLEL—Martin Russ.  
333 pages, sketches and diagrams.  
Rinehart & Co., NY. \$3.95

War, they say, is a dirty business. This is literally true, but it is hardly a complete description of war. Those who fight wars usually get dirty in the process, but the dirt is normally superficial—it does not penetrate deeper than the pores. To put it another way, there are worse things than war; even so distinguished an authority as Admiral Radford has said so.

The war in Korea lasted almost as long as our part of WW II—long enough for it to become routine—although, of course, its cost in lives and treasure was much less. For Marines, it was a war of variety. In the late fall of 1951 the Korean war entered a new phase—the *dirty* phase. At about this time, Martin E. Russ, of Buffalo, NY was inducted into the Marine Corps. *The Last Parallel* is his war journal.

Mr. Russ, then a 21-year-old corporal, arrived in Korea in early December 1952. Behind him were Parris Island, a fretful period at Camp Lejeune, and a muddled three months at Camp Pendleton in the T&R Command. Cpl Russ had had his troubles: leaving college after his second year, he had been miserable in boot camp, not, however, without glimpsing certain basic truths about Marines. Instinctively, he had sought the ultimate test—infantry combat—but had met initial frustration.

In Korea, an armorer's MOS took him to the Ordnance Battalion and more frustration. The three weeks he spent there were, you gather, a torment.

Then in an entry dated *January 5th through 10th, 1953*, he says: "now I'm the (sic) automatic rifleman of the—squad of the—platoon of Able Company of the First Battalion of the First Regiment of the First Marine Division, and it's about time. Although I've only been with Able Company for five days, I consider it an honor to be here . . . I'd better admit one thing right now. I'd rather be right here than anywhere else in the world. Whether I'm ready for the loony bin or not is beside the point. That's how I feel. When I change my mind I'll say so."

At the end, he had not changed his mind although the war he came to

know was the low point of a conflict that had had its ups and downs. The terrain he saw had been occupied by Marines for almost a year, and during that time had been subjected to many changes but few improvements.

By the time Cpl Russ arrived on the scene, the "dirty" war had settled into a deadly routine. The patrol routes were carpeted with the comm-wire left by previous patrols. The operation overlays were covered with symbols for barages, concentrations, minefields and sectors of fire; the daily routine was fixed—nothing new seemed possible. Nicknames were the vogue for places—East Berlin; Little Rock; Frisco; Detroit; Old Bunker; New Bunker; Siberia; Hedy; Castle Rock; The Pentagon—and operations: Rolls-Royce (body recovery team); Diesel (combat patrol); Mercury (ambush); Cadillac (reconnaissance patrol). Same ground, same holes, same



patrols, same enemy, day after day. Vigilance was the watchword, but vigilance, too, became monotonous. And to many young Marines (and some not so young), this tedious and grubby drill became a way of life. This, to them, was war.

From his journal, one gathers that Cpl Russ's appetite for this war was insatiable. He was a permanent volunteer—for Diesels, Mercurys, Cadillacs, Rolls-Royces, listening posts, anything that would take him forward of the MLR. A big man (6-foot-2, 175 lbs.), he developed a great affection for his BAR, considering it the supreme individual weapon. A veteran of prep school theatrics, he was theatrical in all that he did. To his superiors, he must have been alternately a trial and a delight. But he was determined to be

a hard-charger, and within certain limits he obviously succeeded.

To this reviewer, *The Last Parallel* is a spotty book. When the author is on or forward of the MLR, he has an instinct for the right words to describe the action, the prevailing atmosphere and his own reactions. But in the rear areas, he indulges in the kind of vivid writing that either clicks or falls flat. His doesn't click.

*The Last Parallel* is a Book-of-the-Month Club selection, which obviously means it will be read by many people. Of the Marines who read it, those who were in Korea during Russ's time will probably find much in it that hits home. Those who were there in 1950-51 may regret, as does this reviewer, that a book had to be written about Marines in a role for which they were singularly miscast.

Reviewed by LtCol Houston Stiff  
ED: The reviewer was a battalion commander in Korea during the first year of the war.

### Circling the Earth . . .

SATELLITE! Erik Bergaust and William Beller. 272 pages. Hanover House, NY. \$3.95

To many of us the forthcoming International Geophysical Year may well be an unknown quantity, or at best a mysterious affair which should concern only others. But to many people throughout the world the period 1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958 will be of tremendous significance. For it is during this International Geophysical Year that approximately 50 nations, including the United States and Russia, will participate or co-operate in an intensive study of the Earth and its environment. Instruments will be sent many hundreds of miles from the earth's surface, satellites will be sent on orbits circling the globe, and stations and laboratories will be sited all over the world to record the scientific information being sought.

Even the most casual follower of the nation's news media has been provided the opportunity to become aware of this program through the recent announcements that the United States will launch its first satellite into space and otherwise participate in this venture.

Although this book is intended for consumption by the layman—a word of caution is in order. In describing



## NEW BOOKS

The books listed below have been received recently by the GAZETTE for review. More detailed reviews of many of these books will appear in subsequent issues. These books may be purchased at the GAZETTE BOOKSHOP now. Association members who are interested in reviewing books should notify the Editor and Publisher.

**COMPANY Q**—Richard O'Connor. Doubleday, NY. \$3.95

A fictional account by a distinguished author of a unique Civil War organization. Such formations as Company Q were established as punishment units and these were given the dirtiest jobs—jobs no other organization would touch.

**AT WHATEVER COST**—R. W. Thompson. Coward-McCann, Inc., NY. \$3.50

Subtitled "The Story of the Dieppe Raid," the book is just that. This is a graphic account of the bold and terrible venture which some 6,000 men undertook, and less than 2,000 returned.

**THE MEN WHO MADE THE NATION**—John Dos Passos. Doubleday, NY. \$5.95

In the 20-odd years from Yorktown to the Louisiana Purchase, a handful of men dreamed, fought, compromised and finally brought into being the brash creation called the United States of America. In this, the ninth book in the Mainstream of America Series, John Dos Passos presents the history of those critical years.

**NOTES ON ATOMIC ENERGY FOR MEDICAL OFFICERS**—Philosophical Library, NY. \$4.75

Prepared by the staff of the British Royal Naval Medical School, this book provides basic information on the short-long-term effects of an atomic explosion and the dangers from other kinds of radiological warfare.

**AEROPLANES AND AERO-ENGINES**—Philosophical Library, NY. \$6.00

This fourth edition contains 24 cut-away drawings which have appeared in *The Aeroplane* (a British magazine) over the past 3 years. These range from the largest airliners such as the Bristol Type 175 Britannia to the latest general purpose craft. Each drawing is supported by an extensive key, and there are 10 illustrations of aircraft power plants.

**CONSPIRACY AMONG GENERALS**—Wilhelm von Schramm. Charles Scribner's Sons, NY. \$3.95

An account of the aftermath of the abortive plot on Hitler's life, 20 July 1944, as experienced by top German officers stationed in France.

what the scientists interested in astrodynamics, or the study dealing with the performance, stability and control of spacecraft will learn in the process of experiment in this new science the authors say, "Astrodynamics will have an understanding of basic celestial mechanics, especially elementary orbital mechanics, including perturbations, precession, and other similar effects of planetary distortion or simple multiple-body situations." To those potential readers who readily can understand that quotation this book will be interesting, highly informative and easy to digest. To others the same true value from the book will be obtained only through careful reading and associated study. However, the information to be gained is well worth the effort.

The authors are experts in the field. Erik Bergaust is not only an experienced writer, but is a guided missile consultant for several engineering and aircraft companies. He is also Rocket and Missile Editor of *American Aviation*. William Beller, currently Managing Editor of *Aero Digest*, is an expert in aerodynamics and aeronautical design, and has had experience in the aircraft production industry.

Reviewed by Col R. C. McDonough  
ED: This reviewer is with Training Branch, G3, HQMC.

### The Civil War . . .

**THIS HALLOWED GROUND**—Bruce Catton. 400 pages. Doubleday & Co., Inc., NY. \$5.95

Once again Bruce Catton (1954 Pulitzer Prize Winner) has drawn a word picture of the Civil War in a style that belongs to him alone. *This Hallowed Ground* deals with the events that led to the Southern Secession, the attack on Fort Sumter, and to the surrender at Appomattox.

Mr Catton begins with the growing arguments, the fears, and the surges of unchecked emotion that would cost half a million lives before its momentum could be stopped.

From Manassas and Bull Run, Mr Catton takes the reader through each ensuing battle describing the battles of Sharpsburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, Vicksburg and finally to a moving account of the surrender at Appomattox.

Reviewed by 1stLt H. B. Hadley, Jr.  
ED: The lieutenant is a company officer at MCS.

### More Civil War . . .

**A DIFFERENT VALOR: THE STORY OF GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON**, C. S. A.—Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingood 470 pages.

Illustrations, maps. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., NY. \$6.00

Two wars—fought against the background of a third—form the themes of this, the latest in the deluge of Civil War books now flooding the bookstores. The first is the personal conflict between Gen Joseph E. Johnston, CSA, and Confederate President Jefferson Davis, whose dislike for Johnston antedated the Civil War—perhaps going back as far as their cadet days at West Point. The second is Johnston's inner struggle which saw him sublimate his innate desire to defend his personal honor against Davis' slurs in order to more effectively serve the Confederacy.

From the moment he accepted appointment as the first brigadier general in the Confederate Regular Army, Johnston was plagued with a high command that seemed to be continually conspiring to make the solution of his already difficult problems impossible. The President often deliberately bypassed Johnston in the chain of command and communicated directly with subordinate commanders. The President repeatedly issued ambiguous orders for the execution of impossible tasks, and consistently ignored Johnston's requests for clarification of these ambiguous orders. Finally, the President relieved Johnston of his command for failing to halt, attack and defeat a much superior invading army.

There are more colorful and more celebrated Confederate leaders to study—Jackson, Stuart, Beauregard, Lee and others. More than any of these, possibly excepting Lee, Joe Johnston was a model of the professional soldier in his selfless devotion to duty. His principles are still worthy of study.

Reviewed by Capt D'Wayne Gray  
ED: This reviewer is with Historical Branch, G3, HQMC.

### For Collectors . . .

**ARMS AND ARMOR IN COLONIAL AMERICA 1526-1783**, Harold L. Peterson, 345 pages, 318 illustrations. The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, Pa. \$12.50

Scholars have approached every aspect of colonial life save the means by which the colonists waged this continuous warfare. All these aspects of American and social culture had their impact on the life of the colonies as well as that of Europe. Not the least influence brought to bear was that of the means of war. A study of these means and of their overall influence is long overdue.

Harold L. Peterson has offered what is a landmark study if not the final word on the subject. And, perhaps no man in America is better qualified to do this. Peterson is the Staff Historian for the

National Park Service and is both a trained historian and a nationally recognized authority in this field.

Virtually every type of arm or armor used in America is illustrated, either from the author's own collection or from other nationally known collections. In each case, their development is traced and their use is documented and explained. Where possible, contemporary or excellently reconstructed illustrations show this military gear in use by soldiers of the period.

Some myths are exposed such as the long held belief that the Pennsylvania rifle was the dominant weapon of the Revolution. It was not, being without the essential bayonet and being painfully slow to reload. Riflemen invariably had to be closely supported by line troops armed with muskets and bayonets. New material is brought to light such as the fact that in the earlier period weapons and tactical development in America outstripped that of Europe and influenced changes there.

Collectors and students of arms, students of the military art, and those who merely are interested in early Americana will savor this book. It has been endorsed for authenticity by the Company of Military Collectors and Historians.

Reviewed by LtCol Brooke Nihart  
Ed: LtCol Nihart is a member of the Company of Military Collectors and Historians.

#### Pictorial Review . . .

YEAR'S PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD—The Editors of YEAR. 606 pages. Illustrated, maps. Year, Inc., Wilton, Conn. \$12.95

The Editors of Year have produced a magnificent one-volume history of the world in which we live with the publication of this book. Up to one million pictures were considered before the 2,000 which appear here were selected. These are masterfully tied together with some 200,000 words in narrative and captions. Also included are portfolios of 50 color plates and historical maps.


In both color and black and white, the Editors have prepared a comprehensive and colorful history which traces civilization from the time of the cave man to our own tense 1957. No nation, no race, no geographical area is slighted. This is a history of the entire world, and the entire world is shown.

This is not a book that can be digested in one casual sitting. It is one that will be looked at and read many times.

Henry Steele Commager, professor of history at Columbia University, wrote the foreword for this volume.

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dent in 1914, Capt Wills, who had then succeeded Capt Snyder as Secretary, cabled or telegraphed the news of the appointment to the senior Association member at every post, station or with any fleet. It is worthy of note that the first message of congratulation to Gen Barnett was received by him at Culebra from the Legation Guard at Nicaragua, and on the same day one from the Legation Guard at Peking was received at Washington.

On 18 January 1915, a ballot was sent out by the Association for the choice of a Board of Control, of which the Commandant was to be President, and two other officers, to take office for the year beginning 1 July 1915. The Board of Control for the year was announced as follows: President, Maj Gen Barnett, Commandant; Col George Richards and Col John A. Lejeune, and the Constitution as adopted was published.

At an informal meeting of the Board of Control in the Commandant's office in June 1915, Capt Frank E. Evans (Ret) was elected Secretary and Treasurer. It was determined at this meeting that it was the sense of the Board of Control that the annual dues, designated in the Constitution as not to exceed \$10.00 per annum for active members, with dues of associate members to be later determined, should be reduced on 1 July 1916 to \$5.00, further reductions to be made thereafter when the finances of the Association warranted such reduction. The principle of compensation for the Secretary and Treasurer, not to exceed \$50.00 per month, was also agreed to.

At a second informal meeting in the fall of 1915 it was decided that the Association should publish a quarterly magazine to be known as THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE.

On 27 October 1915, with the sanction of the Board of Control, the Secretary mailed every officer of the Corps on the active and retired lists, a circular letter in which was embodied an authoritative statement, in detail, of the increase of the Corps recommended by the Navy Department to Congress, a resume of the National Rifle Match, in which the Marine Corps won second place, and other matters of interest.

The initial, or first meeting of the Board of Control was held in the office of the Major General Commandant, at Washington, at 3 o'clock on 17 January 1916, with a full attendance and the substance of the informal meeting was made a matter of record in the minutes of the meeting.

Other business transacted at the meeting related to the publication of THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, and fixing the sum of \$3.00, a part of the annual dues, to be set aside as subscription price to the GAZETTE. The question of admitting noncommissioned officers of the Marine Corps to associate membership, above a fixed rank, was discussed and it was decided to submit this matter to a mail vote at the time of the election of the new Board of Control. In the interim the privilege of subscription to the GAZETTE was extended to noncommissioned officers.

The Secretary was also empowered to embody news matter of interest, and not confidential in their nature, to members of the Association by circular letter in addition to the publication of the GAZETTE. The Board of Control then adjourned, subject to call.

The general form of this initial number of THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE will be followed in the succeeding issues. Officers are urged, however, to contribute ideas as to departments that should, in their opinion, be made a regular feature of the GAZETTE, and to submit articles or the themes for articles. With the wide variety of professional subjects suggested by defense base work, service with the fleets, expeditions, street fighting, rifle practice, aviation, artillery, mining, signalling, handling of troops, the civil functions attending occupation, and historical articles there is no dearth of material. The translation of articles from foreign authorities presents a fascinating field, and an opportunity to keep the Corps abreast of the best thought in professional circles abroad. There are many sources for historical articles that have not been fully covered in Cullom's History of the Corps, and much has happened since its publication that should be of vital interest. The origin of the words and the air of the Corps' song, *From the Halls of Montezuma*, the significance of customs of the Corps, the development of its uniform and countless other details can be placed in permanent form through the medium of the GAZETTE.





With this March issue, the GAZETTE observes its 41st year of publication. The magazine started as a quarterly, changing to a bi-monthly and later a monthly in 1943. The following account appeared in the first issue of the GAZETTE, March 1916, and was written by the editor, Capt Frank E. Erans, USMC (Ret). It is still of interest to Association members, and this anniversary is an appropriate time to reprint it.

Guantanamo, where Huntington's battalion won a base for the Atlantic Fleet in 1898 and fresh laurels for the Corps, was the birthplace of the Marine Corps Association. The first steps taken toward its organization were made by the officers of Col Littleton W. T. Waller's Provisional Brigade in the winter of 1911. While the organization effected was not a permanent one, owing to unavoidable circumstances, that move was the first fruit of a long-cherished idea of the Corps. The ground broken by Col Waller and his officers hastened the permanent organization that followed, and the lessons of the temporary organization cleared the way toward the permanency that was later won.

On the 25th day of April 1913, the 2d Provisional Brigade of US Marines, under the command of Col Lincoln Karmany, formed the Marine Corps Association. Col Karmany designated LtCol John A. Lejeune, Capt Harold C. Snyder and Capt Davis B. Wills, Assistant Paymaster, as the Executive Committee to act in the organization.

The Executive Committee issued the following statement and 60 officers of the Brigade enrolled as members of the new organization:

*For the purpose of recording and publishing the history of the Marine Corps, publishing a periodical journal for the dissemination of information concerning the aims, purposes and deeds of the Corps, and the interchange of ideas for the betterment and improvement of its officers and men the undersigned hereby form an association to be known as*

**THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION.**

*membership in which shall be open to all officers of the Corps.*

*All matters pertaining to the Association shall be transacted under the direction of an Executive Committee of three officers of the Marine Corps by a majority of the votes of the members of the Association. Upon the written request of 10 per cent of the members of the Association addressed to the Secretary of the Association, he shall cause an election to be held without delay to fill the places on the Executive Committee of those members of such committee named in the request.*

*Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Witness our hands and seals this twenty-fifth day of April one thousand nine hundred and thirteen.*

(Signed) J. A. LEJEUNE.

Lieutenant Colonel, USMC

H. C. SNYDER,

Captain, USMC

D. B. WILLS,

Captain, APM, USMC

The prospectus issued later stated, "What we need is some means of bringing our officers closer together, as well as an organized system of education. We believe that the publication of articles prepared by officers, together with the criticisms of such articles by other officers, will offer an incentive to officers to study professional subjects with a view to preparing other articles themselves for publication and distribution to the Service. In this way the knowledge and experiences of each officer will be available to every other officer. In time, we will publish a semi-annual, quarterly or monthly magazine devoted entirely to Service interests."

The recurrence of expeditions hampered the aim of publishing a journal, and the activities of the officers were necessarily confined to interesting officers in the Association and laying plans for its permanency. When the appointment of Col George Barnett as Major General Commandant of the Corps for a term of 4 years was made by the Presi-